Collective Decision Making
Recent laboratory experimental work has begun to uncover inconvenient facts pointing to systematic differences in outcomes in strategic environments that are implemented as a game played between teams of players rather than individual decision makers. Yet these observations remain in the category of “anomalies” for which there is no existing general theoretical model that can unify these anomalies under a single umbrella.
The specific research project that Tom Palfrey wishes to focus on at WZB aims to develop a general behavioral theory of games played by teams of players and to examine the various implications derived from such a theory by designing and analyzing data generated from laboratory experiments. Understanding how teams – as opposed to individuals – make decisions is essential for understanding the behavior of organizations, especially in strategic and competitive environments. One of the objectives of the project is to identify properties of collective choice rules (for example, monotonicity or positive responsiveness) that lead to the successful informational aggregation within a team.