

*Project on Democracy and Local Governance in Germany:
An East-West Comparison of Local Government*

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Local Political/Administrative Elites: Roots and Roles

Thomas R. Cusack

Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung

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Introduction

This paper examines the backgrounds, ties, and styles of German local political and administrative elites. It gives particular emphasis to the question of whether significant differences exist, both between the two parts of Germany and between different types of elites, as well as differences that might occur along partisan lines.

There are different theoretical perspectives on the origins of democratic elites. Controversy has prevailed for a long time on which of these perspectives most accurately portrays the dynamics of elite recruitment and reproduction. Studies of local elites have mirrored this controversy and reached their peak in studies of local political decision making in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. Today it would be difficult to say that a consensus opinion on the issues surrounding this controversy has developed. In this paper we hope to shed some light on the questions raised in these debates by examining the backgrounds of local government elites within Germany.

Three visions or theoretical images of political elites within modern democracies are current in modern discussions. One rests upon the classical image of elites being dominated by the traditional leading classes of their communities. Access to the elite is restricted. The restrictions to access are class-based and there is a strong tendency for elite members to be drawn from classes within the community that have higher socio-economic status (Bachrach, 1967; Putnam, 1976). This corresponds to Lasswell's "agglutination" model where stratification in the political system is nearly or perfectly correlated with stratification in the socio-economic system. In its more extreme version, the restrictions are keyed to origins that reflect the involvement of family members in political/administrative activities. In other words, political/administrative elite membership is heavily dependent upon one's parents' membership in such elites (Aberbach, et al, 1981).

A second general view sees restrictions to membership within the elites as being based on the acquisition of skills which themselves require extensive training and education (Aberbach, et al, 1981). In other words, those who achieve elite status, for example, within local government, are individuals who, through their native abilities and capacities acquired through efforts in educational institutions, most qualify to fill these functions. This is a vision of meritocracy. There are two variants to this view. One is the elitist version which suggests that the acquisition of these skills through education is biased toward the children of the upper classes; their families

are in the position to afford them extensive education, an experience relatively rare amongst the lower classes, and through this bias the tendency is for the offspring of existing elites to dominate political/administrative positions within communities.

An alternative and more democratic version of the meritocratic vision suggests that modern society, with its emphasis on equal opportunity, permits all those with the basic native abilities to acquire extensive education and training and through this process enhance their abilities to enter various elites. In this vision, while elites have educational backgrounds that are more extensive than the average citizen, the elite members have social class backgrounds that are typical of the communities in which they serve in political/administrative office.

The third general vision is the democratic one. Here access to elite membership is not restricted by the workings of traditions social, economic, or political hegemony, nor by the biases that accrue through meritocratic forces (Putnam, 1976). Leaders and representatives of the people come from all the people. Their position within the political/administrative elites of their community is independent of their social origins or acquired skills. The members of these elites are interested and concerned citizens motivated to participate in their communities' civic affairs and they are not blocked or hindered from such participation by extraneous constraints. Neither birth nor education play an appreciable role in the filtering process by which people enter the elite.

An ancillary controversy related to elite background that besets the contemporary German scene is the debate surrounding the manner in which the population and territory of the former GDR have been integrated within the existing structures of the Federal Republic. "Colonization" is a term that one often hears being used to describe the way in which the East and West have been joined with the latter not only seen as imposing its values and institutions without regard to the desires and wishes of the population in the East, but also engaging in a process of implanting its own personnel in important political and administrative positions at all levels of government. Certainly there is something to be said for this description when it comes to state government; is this image of carpetbagging also valid for local government elites?

As Putnam (1993) has demonstrated, the character of civic life and the ability to cooperate with others in a community, both on the part of politicians and non-politicians alike, reflect the level of social capital within a community. He also has shown that the latter facilitates successful political (and economic) performance. With this in mind we will attempt to assess the extent

and character of ties with their communities that prevails within these elites. To do so we will focus on a number of questions that deal with the patterns of associational membership maintained by these elites and the profiles of groups and individuals on whom these elites rely.

How well integrated are these elites within their communities? In particular, what sorts of organization/associational ties do they have?. Are these ties extensive or narrow? Do they reflect the basic socio-economic character of the supporters of the parties to which the elite members belong or are they more broadly representative of the entire community? To whom do these elites turn when making decisions? Are they likely to seek advice, support, and help from those within the community or from outside? Do they rely on other politicians/administrators, or do they go to organized interests, the media, or less established participants in the political process? Both of these general issues, the nature of associational affiliation and the patterns of reliance, reflect a concern with the degree and manner in which these elites are tied into political, social, and economic networks of their communities and should shed light on the capacity of these elites to both reflect the concerns of their fellow citizens as well as to engage in the cooperative behavior needed to create a well-functioning governmental system within their communities.

It is often the case that political/administrative elites approach their jobs in dramatically different ways (Aberbach, et al, 1981). The roles that politicians and administrators take on are likely to reflect their partisan affiliations, the constraints of the positions they hold and the context within which they operate, as well as a host of factors that characterize their backgrounds. On the one hand, there is the traditional divide between administration and politics. How strong or weak is this among local government elites within Germany. Do administrators overstep the bounds of their traditional duties and engage in activity of a clearly political character or do they confine themselves to these duties? For politicians there is a corresponding division that often comes to the fore. Do they see themselves as representatives of special and partisan interests or are they prone to see themselves as the representatives of the broad community interests and those with little resources and power?

By concentrating especially on the backgrounds of these elites and then turning to the question of the kinds of roles they play in their local political systems, we are attempting to focus on one aspect of the "so what?" question Putnam (1976) has raised about elite-origin studies. Elites may originate out of the dominant classes of society or their origins may faithfully reflect the

socio-economic structure of their communities, but do these origins have an impact on the way in which they go about fulfilling their official functions or the values and ideology that guide their decisions?

The three themes of origins, ties, and roles are explored in the sections that follow. First, the socio-economic backgrounds of these elites are examined. The questions addressed here allow us to evaluate contending models of democratic elite origins. Do German local government elites fit into the image classic elite theory suggests, i.e., are their origins and life experiences skewed in the direction of the dominant classes of society? Or do these elites fit into either a more meritocratic image or one that more faithfully reflects the social structure of the society in which they live? To address these questions we examine the types of backgrounds of these elites (viz., familial, educational, training, occupational, and the residential ties with the cities in which they serve, as well as the length of time they have been involved in politics and administration). In addition, we also focus on the intensity of involvement in their political-administrative work: are these professionals or simply very active citizens? Second, we deepen the exploration of their connections with their communities by scrutinizing the intensity of their connections with others in the community (organizational/associational memberships) and the identity of those to whom they turn in trying to deal with their political/administrative decision-making tasks. Third, we probe the way in which they see themselves and place particular emphasis on the way in which they describe their political/administrative roles. In addition, an effort is made to account for differences in the political-administrative roles that the elite members see themselves as playing. Emphasis is given here to the influence of their official positions, their partisan affiliations, the ties they have to their communities, and a number of background factors.

Background

Origins and Time of Residence

Following the major movements of population connected with World War II and its aftermath, neither part of Germany was noted for exceptionally high, at least by international standards, residential mobility on the part of the population. If residences changed, more often than not

the new residence was within the same town or city. Still, there has been a fair amount of mobility. For example, in the Old Federal States between 1970 and 1991, each year an average of 4.9 percent of the total population moved from one town to another.¹ The members of the local government elites within our samples would appear to have been somewhat similar to their fellow-citizens in this regard. In both East and West, a little more than a third of the entire samples perform their political/administrative functions within the towns or cities in which they were born (see Table 3.1). Nevertheless, quite large proportions come from the nearby regions of the towns or the federal states within which the towns are located. Adding all of these categories together, over 60 percent of the sample in the East and 71 percent of the sample in the West were born in the same states where the towns that they now carry out their political/administrative jobs are situated.

There are some significant differences across the categories of offices as well as parties with regard to this issue.² Council members in both East and West have a slightly higher average tendency to be from the same towns. Caucus leaders in the West stand out as the group most likely to have their origins in the cities in which they carry out this function (nearly 49 percent), although in the East this group is below the sample average on this dimension. Party leaders in both East and West are below the entire sample averages, as are department heads and individuals holding higher office. Indeed, those holding higher office in the West have the lowest propensity to serve in the towns in which they were born (approximately 21 percent).

It should be noted that there are no office groupings in the East in which people born in the West constitute a very large proportion of the whole. Within the entire Eastern sample transplants from the West constitute only 6.8 percent of the total; most of these, i.e., 5.7 percent, were people who came East after the "Wende" (see Table 3.2). The office category with the largest share of West transplants to the East is that of the department heads, with 15.1 percent being from the West, all of whom appear to have come after the "Wende." The category with the second largest group on this dimension is that of higher office holders. 10.6 percent of these have come from the West and nearly all (i.e., 10.1) have come after the "Wende." Among council members the

1 This figure is based on calculations made on data for population movements drawn from the Statistisches Bundesamt's *Datenreport 1994: Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*.

2 Classification by office held is based on information collected prior to the survey field work. With the exception of the data presented in Table 3.37, these classificatory data are used throughout this paper. Note that a fair number of individuals hold more than one office. Their characteristics are incorporated in the values reported for each of the offices held.

share is 4.3 percent for all members and 8.7 percent for caucus leaders. About half of the transplants from the West among council members came after the "Wende" and slightly more than a third of the caucus leaders who have come from the West arrived after that. Among local party leaders this share is extraordinarily low, at 1.3 percent, none of whom claim to have migrated after the "Wende."

Only one party stands out for an exceptionally low level on this dimension; this is the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (see Table 3.3). This is particularly the case in the West where less than 20 percent of the party members were born in the towns in which they hold political or administrative office. Still, when one looks at where most of these individuals came from, it is clear that there is a strong tendency on the part of this party's members to stem at least from the same regions or states wherein the towns they now serve in public office are located. In the West, the CDU/CSU members have the strongest tendency to be from the same town -- a pattern mirrored in the East as well. In the East there are no parties with a very large share of post-"Wende" transplants (see Table 3.4). The party with the largest share, the SPD, is composed of only 8.5 percent of people in this category.

Despite the relatively low number of town/city natives, the average length of residence in these communities for the members of both samples is still quite high: in the East the typical elite member has spent 64 percent of her/his life in the place where the office is held, while in the West this figure is 69 percent (see Table 3.5). There are no major differences in this regard with respect to the kind of office held, although department heads in the East do have a lower figure, i.e., 55 percent, while caucus leaders in the East score with a relatively high figure of 76 percent. Differences across the parties do exist (see Table 3.6), but only in a few cases are there appreciable deviations. The lowest figure is for the Bündnis 90/Grünen in the West (56 percent), while the highest figure is also to be found in the West where CDU/CSU members score with 78 percent.

The non-natives of the elites in these communities, while constituting a large share of both samples, are still not strangers to these places. As shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, most have spent a large part of their *adult* lives in the towns/cities that they serve in public office. Few important differences hold between East and West in this matter; indeed, non-natives in the East have spent, on average, 72 percent of their adult lives in these communities and non-natives in the West have lived for 76 percent of their adult lives in these places.

In sum, while the local political/administrative elites are not notable for having relatively large numbers of native-born, they seem to have fairly strong connections to the cities in which they carry out their official functions given the proportions of their adult lives that they have spent within these communities. There are also few signs, at least at the local government level, that colonization, in the form of the presence of large numbers of post-"Wende" transplants from the West, has occurred in the region of the former GDR. Few officials have migrated from West to East to serve in local government, particularly in elective office capacities. Where there are sizable groups of transplants, i.e., among department heads and holders of higher office, the shares are still surprisingly low, 15 and 10 percent, respectively. And while many may have migrated to these towns, the typical migrant has still spent a relatively long period of her or his adult life in these communities. If the amount of time spent in a community can be seen as the basis for establishing roots there, then these elites are well-rooted in their towns/cities.

Age and Gender

Few differences also hold with respect to the average ages of the various elite categories. While generally slightly younger on average in most cases in the East, the typical member of these elites is in her or his late 40s to early 50s (see Tables 3.9 and 3.10). While there are much younger and much older people active in local political and administrative offices, indeed the range extends from the age of 18 to well past the typical retirement age, membership in this elite is typically held by people with significant life experience. Indeed, in the West two-thirds of the elites are over the age of 40. In the East, the percentage over 40 is nearly 56 percent.

No data drawn from the survey will be reported on here with respect to the gender breakdowns of these elites. As noted in an earlier report (Cusack, 1995), women are under-proportionately represented within these elites. This is especially so amongst the elites in the Old Federal States where females constitute less than 20 percent of the entire sample frame used to conduct the survey. In this region as well, women are even less likely to hold administrative or higher office and are in the main confined to the category of council members. In the New Federal States, the picture is a little brighter with females accounting for slightly more than a quarter of the elites within the sample frame. In addition, women are more likely to head departments in the East than they are in the West.

Involvement in Politics/Administration and Political Parties

One place where significant differences in experience between the two sets of elites exists is to be found in the length of involvement in politics and administration (see Table 3.11a and 3.12a). Here, perhaps not surprisingly, the average length of involvement is markedly shorter in the East than in the West. On average, the typical member of the local elite in the East has spent approximately eight and one half years in politics/administration; notably, 76 percent of these people entered politics/administration only after the "Wende." In other words, the members of the political/administrative elite in the East are overwhelmingly people who had no official connection to the SED regime. In contrast, the typical elite member in the West has spent nearly 19 years in politics/administration. Few significant differences are to be found across the different types of office-holders, although in the West it can be seen that party leaders have relatively shorter tenures in public affairs; in contrast, administrators and holders of higher office have relatively longer tenures.

The length of political experience does vary significantly across the different parties. In the East, the PDS has members that have typically spent a fair amount of time in politics/administration relative to the members of other parties in this region. Indeed, more than 50 percent of the members of the party were involved in politics/administration prior to the transformation of the SED into the PDS. The two former block parties also have a fair number of holdovers from the previous regime. In the case of the FDP 36 percent were in public affairs before the "Wende," and in the case of the CDU 29 percent were so involved when it still had its block status. In contrast, only 12 percent of the Bündnis 90/Grünen and 6 percent of the SPD claim to have had involvement in politics/administration prior to the "Wende." Interestingly, none of the members of the miscellaneous electoral groups and parties claim to have had political/administrative involvement before to the Wende. In the West only one party stands out for its difference in this regard. This party, the Bündnis 90/Grünen, has a low average level of about 11 years of involvement in politics/administration for its typical member.

To get a sense of how long these elites have been in their present positions we provide the data listed in Tables 3.11b and 3.12b. There, using categorizations of office held based on the respondent's reply to the question of what her/his most important official position at present is, we have listed the average number of years in that office as well as the percentage of their total time in politics/administration that their tenures in these offices constitute. Table 3.11b provides the breakdown by office categories. Again, pronounced East-West differences are manifest in the number of years in the present office. Across office categories, the individuals with the

smallest percentage of their careers in the present office in both East and West are caucus leaders. In the East department heads have spent the greatest proportion of their careers in their present positions. In the West, though, it is council members who lead on this dimension.

Table 3.12b restricts the focus to only council members in presenting tenure data by party grouping. In the West, the members of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen have the shortest average number of years in office and these years also constitute the smallest percentage of their careers in politics. While those in the smaller parties and electoral groups as well as those without partisan affiliation have the next lowest average numbers of years in office, these years represent far greater percentages of their political careers than are to be found among council members from the larger, more established parties. The most noticeable grouping in the East is once again the members of the PDS. Their times in their present positions represent a relatively small proportion of their time in politics.

The length of time in politics/administration thus varies markedly across the different parties. Given some of the age differences that exist across a number of the parties, it is interesting to ask what was the typical age of entry into politics? Figure 3.1 provides some information on this question. Here we can see that while the non-partisan grouping in the West has a significant amount of political/administrative experience, its members also entered at relatively early age, i.e., approximately 27. The Bündnis 90/Grünen in the West, though marked by the least experience, are also one of the groups whose members entered at a relatively early age, approximately 30. This is similar to the members of the CDU/CSU and the SPD in the West, as well as to the PDS in the East. Most of the party members of the East, though, both have little experience and entered politics/administration at a much later age -- as can be seen by their concentration in the upper right hand quadrant of Figure 3.1.

Of course, the average length of tenure in local politics/administration may be influenced by whether one grew up in the town/city where one is serving in office (see Table 3.13 and 3.14). This seems to be especially the case only in the West. Here, non-natives have spent slightly less than 60 percent of their adult lives in politics/administration, while the figure for natives is closer to 70 percent. These differences hold across the several office categories to varying degrees, and is only contradicted in the case of the different parties when one sees that non-natives have had spent longer parts of their adult lives in this area only amongst the Bündnis 90/Grünen and the members of the smaller parties and elector groups. Interestingly, in the East the PDS members have spent far and away more of their adult lives in politics/administration than the members of all the other parties in the region.

The length of membership in political parties also differs markedly (see Tables 3.15 and 3.16). In the West, the typical member of a political party joined in 1976, while in the East the typical member entered her/his party in 1985. Indeed, in the East, nearly 70 percent of the party members joined after the "Wende." In the West, the two groupings that stand out are the Bündnis 90/Grünen and those members of the smaller parties and electoral groupings. In both cases the typical member joined in the mid-1980s while in all the other parties the typical member joined in the early to mid-1970s. In the East, the picture is complementary. The typical member of the Bündnis 90/Grünen and those of the smaller parties and electoral groupings joined in 1991. In the case of the former, 95 percent joined after the "Wende." The SPD is also marked by members with late entry. The average year of entry was 1989 but fully 94 percent joined after the "Wende." On the other hand, the PDS and the former block parties are characterized by members with long term membership dating back to the late 1970s and early 1980s. Approximately half or less of their members joined after the "Wende."

In sum, particularly in the West, these elites can be characterized as having quite extensive experience in politics/administration. The typical politician/administrator in local government in this region has close to 20 years experience in this field. In the East, the picture is starkly different. Most are relative new-comers to politics and administration. Only in the case of parties connected to the old regime does one find a large number of people with more lengthy tenure in politics/administration.

Parents in Politics

Research on the background of political/administrative elites in the federal government in Germany (Aberbach, et al, 1981) has demonstrated that there is a very pronounced tendency for people in such positions to come from families whose members have held political or public administration jobs. In other words, there is in Germany, and indeed elsewhere, a "political class" which tends to reproduce itself, at least at the central government level. This is not to say that political/administrative office is inherited or that people coming from non-political familial backgrounds have no chance to enter and succeed in politics/administration. Rather it is meant to suggest that there is a very high likelihood that one's involvement in public affairs is often associated with members of one's family having been likewise engaged.

At the local government level it would appear that this tendency, while not absent, is quite attenuated. Tables 3.17 and 3.18 provide information on the political/administrative involvement by the parents of the local elites. Overall, one can see that nearly one in five had at least one parent involved in such activity -- a much lower rate than found in the study of federal officials, but still a relatively high level. There are no major differences between East and West in this regard, particularly with respect to the different types of office-holders. Across the parties there are some notable differences. In particular, the PDS in the East and the smaller party/electoral groupings in both regions have higher than average rates of parental involvement in politics/official life. Remarkably, in the West one-third of the party members of the smaller parties and electoral groups had one or both parents that were engaged in politics/official life.

Family Class Background

What are the class origins of these elites? Are they, as traditional elite theory would have it, from the upper reaches of society or are they drawn from backgrounds that more faithfully mirror the social structure of their communities? In order to answer this question we have relied on the respondent's reply to a question that asked her/him to name the last principal occupation of the respondent's father. More frequently than with most questions asked of our respondents, no answer was given to this question or the answers provided proved difficult to code. Thus, nearly 25 percent of the respondents in the East cannot be categorized with respect to their fathers' occupation; in the West the figure is around 19 percent. The categorical scheme we have used here allows us to classify the father's last occupation in the following ways: (1) a politician or representative or executive in government; employed in the public sector with professional jobs in (2) education and science or (3) in the traditional civil service, in (4) non-professional civil service jobs, or (5) not classifiable as to professional/non-professional character; employed in the private sector as (6) a manager or self-employed, (7) a professional, (8) a skilled worker, or a (9) non-skilled worker. Two other categories are listed in Tables 3.19-3.23. These are for (10) those described as unemployed (or retired), and (11) those for which no answer was given or for which the answer provided did not allow for classification.

Let us summarize the information presented in Tables 3.19 through 3.23 by focusing on the question of the percentage of the elites having clear working class origins. To do this we exclude

from the total those for which an unclear answer or no answer was provided. We will count as working class three of the remaining ten categories; these are (4) non-professional workers in the traditional public service, (8) skilled and (9) unskilled workers in the private sector.

On this basis it is clear that a significant proportion of the elite, both in the East and in the West, has working class origins. 63.1 percent of the total sample in the East fit into these three categories and 62.1 percent of those in the West also have such origins. Across the different office categories there are only two groupings where clear East-West differences manifest themselves. Among council members only 54.5 percent in the East have working class origins while in the West the figure is nearly 70 percent. This picture is reversed for caucus leaders. Here a far larger percentage of the Easterners (68 percent) have working class origins than do those in the West (viz., 49 percent). Only marginal East-West differences hold with respect to the other three office groupings. Thus, in the East 56.3 percent of the party leaders come from working class families while 58.8 percent of those in the West do so. 68.7 percent of the department heads in the East and 66.7 percent of those in the West come from families where the father had a working class job. Amongst holders of higher office, the figure for the East is 58.1 percent and in the West it is 60 percent.

Tables 3.20 and 3.21 provide breakdowns by party groupings for the entire samples in East and West. Tables 3.22 and 3.23 focus exclusively on the different partisan groupings amongst town-/city-council members. A number of significant points emerge from these tables. First, in both East and West, members of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen are generally among the least likely to have working class family backgrounds. For the entire sample the figure is 51.5 percent in the East and 43.5 percent in the West (among council members the comparable figures are 57.5 percent and 40 percent). Second, members of the Union parties and the SPD in both regions very heavily tend to have working class backgrounds (on average, about two out of every three). This is also the case for the members of the PDS. Third, for the remaining partisan groupings the picture varies but it is clearly that case, as might be expected, that FDP members are less likely than most other groupings to have working class origins.

Education

Within Germany, high officials in the federal bureaucracy overwhelmingly tend to have had a university education. And while certainly not a prerequisite for membership in the Bundestag, nevertheless at least two thirds of the parliamentarians interviewed in the Aberbach, et al (1981) study also had university degrees. Does a similar pattern hold at the local government level? While not quite as widespread, there is still a markedly high percentage of local government political/administrative elites who possess university degrees (see Tables 3.24 and 3.25). And there are significant differences here between East and West. Note that in the East, in communities of a similar size to those included in this study, 17.3 percent of the general population have university degrees; the figure in the West is lower, i.e., 12.2 percent.³ Amongst the elites the averages for the two regional samples are appreciably higher. In the East it is nearly 60 percent while in the West it is 44 percent. Amongst the Eastern elite, approximately 69 percent of holders of higher office and department heads hold degrees. It is slightly less for party leaders (65.3 percent) and caucus leaders (62 percent). About 52 percent of the council members in the region possess degrees -- a figure higher than all but one office category in the West. In the West caucus leaders are the most prone to have a university education, 54.8 percent. They are followed by holders of higher office (50 percent), department heads (47 percent) and council members and party leaders, both with 41.3 percent.

Inter-party differences are quite large on this dimension. Members of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen lead the list with 76.2 percent in the East and 72.7 percent in the West. Only one grouping in the East, the members of smaller parties and electoral groups, has less than 50 percent with a university degree. In the West, the members of the CDU/CSU have a lower than sample average percentage of party members with university degrees (36.8 percent), but one that is slightly higher than found among the members of smaller parties and electoral groups (33.3 percent). Approximately 41 percent of the SPD members hold university degrees. Aside from the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, the only two partisan groupings in the West where a majority have university degrees are the FDP (55.9 percent) and those professing no partisan affiliation (50.8 percent).

³ These figures based on analysis of data from the 1994 ALLBUS Survey Data Set, ZA-Nr. 2400. Information relates to German citizens living within towns or cities with a population size between 20 thousand and 500 thousand.

In sum, many of the members of the local elites in both regions have extensive formal educational experience. This is particularly the case in the East. In both regions, though, these elites have educational experiences that, on average, are considerably greater than those of the general populations within their communities.

Class Background and University Education

Data on the educational backgrounds of these elites can be broken down by their class origins (see Table 3.26). These data provide some evidence that is supportive of the elitist version of the meritocratic image of the origins of these elites. Thus, those coming out of professional and managerial family backgrounds have a significantly higher likelihood of having obtained a university degree. While for the overall sample the figure in the East is 59.2 percent, for those with higher class backgrounds in this region the figure is 70.4 percent. Similarly in the West one sees that while 44.3 percent of the entire sample have university degrees those coming out of professional and managerial class backgrounds have a much higher rate of university education, viz., 66.2 percent. For those with working class backgrounds, the figures are reversed. 50.8 percent in the East and 34.9 percent in the West with this background have university degrees.

Still, when one recalls the much lower percentages of the non-elite populations with university degrees, these figures for elite members from the working class point in an interesting direction. They can be said to be somewhat supportive of the democratic image of meritocracy. Elites in both East and West with working class origins have nearly three times the likelihood of having a university degree relative to the general population. Such figures fit comfortably with an image of an elite that has both skills beyond the average citizen and yet comes from humble origins. This is consistent with the notion of a situation of equal opportunity that has afforded those with the abilities and willingness to advance themselves being able to succeed in entering the elites within their communities.

Qualifications and Skills

Related to the question of education is the issue of the sorts of qualifications and skills these elites bring to their political and administrative work. Tables 3.27 through 3.31 provide information on this issue. The data contained there represent the results of our codings of an open-ended question where the respondents were queried as to the kind of occupational training that they had received. Ten general categories are used. The first set contains four categories where the training clearly took place at university.⁴ A parallel set of four categories is used for non-university training. In each set of four one category contains responses where it is not possible to provide a precise description of the training that was received. Outside of these eight categories there are two others. One is for those still in education or training programs and one is for those who did not answer the question.

Perhaps the most salient difference between the Eastern and Western elites here (and this holds across all office categories) is the fact that a technical occupational training background is the dominant trait in the East while a background in such fields as law, administration, and the humanities mark the Western elites (see Table 3.27). To a significant extent this difference reflects the educational and economic priorities and structures of the two earlier regimes. In the former GDR, as in other socialist lands, there was a very heavy emphasis on skills related to physical production. Indeed, Wolter (1990) notes that by the mid-1980s the former GDR led all other nations in the number of engineers per employed persons within the economy. The service sectors in these systems were very underdeveloped and despite the real growth that occurred in these economies throughout the post-World War II period, there was no marked shift toward service or information-related sectors. This is very much in contrast to the widespread expansion of the services sectors in the capitalist economies during this period.

The excessively high proportion of elite members with technical training in the East (and the correspondingly low numbers of individuals with training in such fields as law and administration) may also reflect a weeding out process that accompanied German Unification

⁴ Note that the figures here do not correspond to the values provided in Tables 3.24 through 3.26. The data in those tables are based on answers to a close-ended question dealing with educational background. Here the data are based on responses to an open-ended question where the respondents were queried as to the type of occupational training that they have undergone. Often more than one response was given. The data presented in the tables of this section are based on the codings for the first occupational training response provided.

If people with the latter backgrounds were serving in political/administrative functions under the old regime, then their chances of holding similar positions under the new regime were diminished.

Tables 3.28 and 3.29 provide breakdowns on training background by party for the entire samples in the East and the West. Corresponding data for council members only are provided in Tables 3.30 and 3.31. In the East the dominance of technical training background holds across all of the party groupings. In the West, the non-technical training background is common to all party groupings but there is variation across these grouping in terms of the character of this non-technical training. Particularly distinct here is the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. Among this party's members nearly a third have university training in such fields as education and the humanities. This represents the largest grouping within the party. On the other hand, non-university training in such fields as banking and administration represent the largest contingent of people in all of the other party groupings in the West.

Main Occupation

Tables 3.32 through 3.36 provide information on the main occupations of the elite members. We have employed the same set of occupational categories that were used to describe the last principal jobs of the respondents' fathers. The first table, 3.32, provides the occupational breakdowns by the type of political/administrative office held. Very few of the elites describe their principal occupation as being a politician, or a representative or executive in government. Indeed, this occupational category is only frequently used by holders of higher office. One can see that a rather large share of the elites, in both East and West, describe themselves as principally employed in professional or managerial positions. While overwhelmingly from working class family backgrounds, relatively few of these elites have not been upwardly mobile. With the exception of department heads and holders of higher office, the majority in both East and West have their principal occupations outside of the public sector.

Tables 3.33 and 3.34 provide the breakdowns for the entire samples of the elites' occupational status by party for the East and the West (Tables 3.35 and 3.36 provide the corresponding figures for council members only). In the East the parties are relatively similar on this dimension although there is a stronger tendency for PDS members to be either employed in the public sector within the fields of education or science or not to be employed at all. A large share of

those affiliated with smaller parties or local electoral groups also have a much higher rate of non-employed (either unemployed, retired, or still studying) status. Greater variation in the occupational patterns are to be seen across the parties in the West. Members of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen are overwhelmingly in professional occupations and they also have the largest share of professionals employed in the public sector while engaged in educational and scientific occupations (this is particularly pronounced among town/city council members representing this party. The Union parties in the West have the highest share of non-professional workers (mainly employed in the private sector) and once again this is particularly pronounced amongst the council members with this party affiliation.

In sum, most of these elites are presently employed in professional or managerial occupations. While quite a few are employed in the public sector, outside of department heads and holders of higher office, these jobs are clearly unassociated with the political positions these elites hold. Overwhelmingly out of working class backgrounds, the typical elite member has clearly achieved a fair degree of upward class mobility.

Amount of Time Involved in Carrying out Official Duties

Using the information provided by the respondents in answer to the question "[w]hat is your most important political or public position?", we classified the elites into the five functional categories that have been used throughout this paper. This classification served as the basis for then ascertaining how intensively involved (in terms of time spent) these individuals are in carrying out their political and /or administrative jobs. Note that a fair proportion of the elites hold more than one official function and so the values provided here will tend to understate the intensity of their involvement in politics and public life. Nevertheless, as Table 3.37 shows, the amount of time spent by these elites in carrying out political and/or administrative tasks is quite significant. At the same time one can see that the time demands vary dramatically across offices or functions.

Thus, council members in the East spend about 11 hours a week on average in carrying out the tasks related to this official function. The time spent by their colleagues in the West is slightly greater, i.e., approximately 13 hours per week on average. Caucus leaders spend more time than other council members on average. In the East the mean figure is 13 and one half hours. It is appreciably higher for caucus leaders in the West where the average is 19 hours per week.

Local party chair-persons spend, on average, about one third of the normal working week carrying out the tasks related to this office. In the East, the average is about 13 hours while in the West it is about 14 hours. Clearly, while the elites holding these three functions are not engaged full time in carrying out the tasks associated with their offices, they still spend a not inappreciable amount of time attending to the tasks involved. As we have seen above, most of these elites state that their main occupation is some position outside of politics. Devoting a third or more of a normal work week to carrying out these political tasks, mostly without remuneration, represents a major measure of commitment on their parts.

Department heads and holders of higher office are, on average, far more engaged in their jobs. On average, they devote more than a normal number of working hours to carrying out their jobs. This is especially so in the New Federal States where department heads average 48 hours a week on the job (the comparable figure in the West is slightly lower at about 46 hours per week). Holders of higher office average 58 hours per week in the East on the job and 48 hours per week in the West.

Ties to the Community

Organizational Involvement

Strong ties to their community help politicians and administrators understand the nature of their communities' problems as well as the attitudes and preferences of their fellow citizens. One particularly important form of connection to the community can be found in involvement in the organizational/associational life of the community (cf. Putnam, 1993; Parry, et al, 1992).

In this regard, the local government political/administrative elites of the two regions appear to be intensively linked to their fellow citizens (see Table 3.38). In the East, 89 percent of the

sample have one or more associational membership. In the West, the figure is an extremely high 96 percent. Note that the figures for normal citizens in comparable cities is 47 percent in the East and 55 percent in the West.⁵

While the two regional elites are rather similar in that nearly all belong to at least one association, they do differ in the scope of their associational affiliations. In the East, the typical elite member belongs to at least two types of associations. In the West, the figure is higher, i.e., 3.17. The most marked difference across office types is to be found between administrative department heads, on the one hand, and all the other office groupings. For the former grouping in the East the average figure is about 1.5 while in the West it is 2.3. All of the other groupings in the East have averages above 2 with the largest average being registered by holders of higher office (2.27). In the West, the only other office grouping with a figure of less than 3 is that of party leaders (2.61). All of the others have well above 3 on average, with both council members and caucus leaders registering 3.42, and holders of higher office again having the largest figure, i.e., 3.51.

In what kinds of associations do these elites maintain membership? In the East there are five types of associations that are the most common. These include unions (30 percent), sports as well as religious or church associations (27.3 percent), cultural associations (27.1 percent) and welfare associations (25.6 percent). Environmental (8.5 percent) and economic (7.4 percent) associations trail well behind all of the other kinds of associations in terms of their popularity as measured by elite membership in the East. While unions are the locus of membership for an even larger percentage (37) of the Western elites, they trail behind in popularity to sports (57.4 percent), cultural (45.6 percent) religious or church associations (39.4 percent) and welfare associations (38.3 percent). Environmental associations also have a much wider membership basis in the West with 22.8 percent of the elite having a membership with one or another of the associations in this category.

5 In the East normal citizens' membership is mainly concentrated in economic associations (mostly labor unions), with 36 percent of the adult population in comparable size towns/cities having membership. The figure in the West is much lower, approximately 24 percent. On the other hand, membership in non-economic associations is appreciably lower in the East, with only 19 percent belonging to such groupings, while in the West membership in such associations approaches 45 percent.

These figures based on analysis of data from the 1992 ALLBUS Survey Data Set, ZA-Nr. 2140. Information relates to German citizens living within towns or cities with a population size between 20 thousand and 500 thousand.

In terms of differences in this matter across the political parties one finds variation in the degree to which party members have at least one associational tie (see Table 3.39). In the East, members of smaller parties and electoral groups have the lowest rate of membership, 80 percent, while elites within the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen have the highest, 92.9 percent. In the West, elites without party affiliation have the lowest rate, 91.5 percent, and members of the Union parties enjoy the highest rate, 98.5 percent. The breadth of membership in different associational types varies. In the East, non-party members have the lowest average rate, 1.55, while the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen have the highest, 2.50. Interestingly in the West it is the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen that has the lowest rate, 2.56, while the SPD has the highest, 3.70.

Are there differences in the kinds of associations that the different parties' members maintain ties with? This is very much the case. In both East and West, the members of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen are most likely to be members of environmental associations, with 40.5 percent in the East and 56.1 percent in the West holding such an affiliation. No other party in the East has as much as 10 percent of its membership holding such affiliations. The situation is somewhat similar in the West, although it should be noted that nearly 29 percent of the West SPD elites have membership in environmental organizations. There is a concentration of membership in religious or church associations on the part of the Union parties in both East and West (51.2 percent). In the West, as well, the Union has even higher percentages of its membership connected to sports associations (59.2 percent) and occupational associations (55.2 percent). The FDP in the West is very similar to the CDU in this region in terms of associational ties, with sport and occupational associations being the most frequent places of membership (67.6 and 55.9 percent, respectively). However, widespread ties to church or religious organizations on the part of these elites are absent. In the East, however, only one kind of organizational affiliation stands out for the FDP party members; this is with cultural associations where the membership rate is 42.9 percent. For the PDS, far and away the most popular associational affiliation is with labor unions (58.1 percent). This predilection is also evident amongst SPD members in both East and West. However, in the West other types of associations enjoy nearly the same level of popularity with the local elites of the SPD. Thus, 60.9 percent belong to sports associations, 59.1 percent are members of welfare associations, and 54.9 percent belong to cultural associations.

Elite members having no political party affiliation or who belong to small parties and electoral groups tend to have lower overall rates of organizational membership. In the East there seem

to be no particular types of associations that attract the membership of these elites to any wide extent. In the West, sports associations seem to be highly favored, particularly among elites from the smaller parties and electoral groups (72 percent)

In sum, the typical local government elite member appears to have relatively strong ties to her/his community through associational memberships. Associational life in Germany is rather vibrant, and reputedly more so in the West than in the East. Nevertheless, these elite members can be characterized as being far more likely to have such ties than their fellow citizens. Variation holds across the different types of office holders in this regard, and it is clear that political office holders are far more active in their communities associational life than are administrative office holders.

Partisan differences are also evident in terms of associational ties. And while there is a modest degree of variation in the extent to which members of the different parties belong to at least one association, and even more significant variation in the number of types of associational affiliation, the most striking differences hold with respect to the kinds of associations with which the members of the various parties retain ties. The patterns of these ties are much in keeping with the political principles and concerns of the different party elites.

Reliance

In order to get a more refined sense of the ties that these elites have to their community and the influence these ties have on how they go about their business we have posed directly to them the question "to whom do they turn for support when making a political/administrative decision." We provided a lengthy list of groups/individuals that they might rely upon and requested that they simply check off those to whom they often turn for such support. In the West there were 21 such categories of groups and individuals. In the East the same list was used but another category, "colleagues in West German partner cities," was added, thus making 22 categories. Tables 3.40 and 3.41 provided detailed breakdowns to the responses to these questions across the two regions both by political/administrative office and by political party affiliation. Obviously, an extensive amount of information is being provided here and to facilitate the interpretation of these results we have organized the many categories of potential targets of reliance into 9 broader groupings. The first deals with party politicians at both the communal and higher levels of government. The second includes elected officials inside the city

government. The third deals with administrators at both local and higher levels of government. The fourth includes activist groupings inside the community. The fifth incorporates economic associations and institutions. The sixth is a miscellaneous grouping containing various categories of what could be referred to as the general public. The seventh deals only with the local media in the form of local newspapers. The eighth contains colleagues in other cities. The ninth includes the single category of "close friends and sympathizers."

Table 3.41 presents breakdowns on the patterns of reliance by the different office categories. The most striking contrast here is between administrative officers, i.e., department heads, and all the other categories of office holders. Less likely to call on politicians (outside of the mayor), dependent on higher executive and administrative officials, they are clearly less likely to rely on non-governmental actors and are also more likely to depend on administrative officials at higher levels of government as well as colleagues in other cities. This holds for both East and West as do the patterns of reliance found for the other four categories of office holders. There seems to be strong reliance on local party politicians, as well as local executive and administrative officials. The public (as a whole) is cited by a large number of council members, caucus and party leaders, but with less frequency by holders of higher office. This also holds for the grouping of "close friends and sympathizers." A marked difference does exist between East and West in terms of the reliance on the local media with this grouping cited far more frequently in the West than in the East.

Table 3.4.1 provides the breakdown of reliance patterns in East and West by party affiliation. The most striking differences here are to be seen between the more established parties, the CDU/CSU, the FDP, and the SPD, on the one hand, and the other groupings, such as the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (in both East and West) and the PDS (in the East), on the other. The latter are far more likely to cite non-establishment groupings and individuals, such as those in category 4, the general public, local newspapers, as well as "close friends and sympathizers," as sources of support. On the economic side, parties of the left, particularly the SPD and the PDS, are more likely to cite unions as sources of support while the center and right parties (at least in the West) are more likely to seek support from regional economic groupings such as the local chamber of commerce. As with associational affiliations, general political orientations of the parties correspond with patterns one sees in terms of who their members rely upon.

Political/Administrative Roles

Often the border between politics and administration is nebulous. Indeed, many argue that there is a large grey zone wherein leading administrators take on activities that appear to be very political in their character. The respondents in our study share this view. When asked whether they believed that "top-level administrators operate in an intermediate zone -- where matters not purely administrative but also political are dealt with," the overwhelming majority of the local elites in both East and West said that this was often or always the case. In the West, 87.6 percent characterized the situation in this way, while, in the East, 79.6 responded similarly. In the West, only 6.8 percent said this is never or hardly ever the situation, while 5.6 indicated that they did not know. In the East, only 7.4 percent disagreed, while 13.1 percent said they could not answer this question.

It may indeed be the case that the reality of modern day communal government requires such a departure from the traditional conception that there should be a strict separation of politics from administration. Ultimately, the question is how well the two are mixed. Does this mixture produce satisfactory or unsatisfactory outcomes? In both regions the answer to this question is to be seen in the fact that the majority of the respondents saw the results as mixed and approximately 20 percent in both regions saw the practice as bad or very bad (see Table 3.42). On the other side, 25 percent in the East and 28.4 percent in the West evaluate the situation as positively or very positively. There are clear differences in these evaluations across the various office categories. Those with exclusively political offices, i.e., council members and caucus and party leaders are much less likely to view this practice positively than are department heads and holders of higher office.

Among the political parties, two clearly stand out for their tendency to see this practice in a less than positive light (see Table 3.43). These are the Bündnis 90/Grünen (in both East and West) and the PDS. Among the Bündnis 90/Grünen only about 12 percent in the East and slightly less than 17 percent in the West say that the situation is good or very good. Indeed, among the members of this party in the East, approximately 40 percent see it as bad or very bad. Only 12.9 percent in the PDS see it positively. One might also note that the members of the smaller parties and elector groups in the West are also less than positive in their evaluations of this practice.

Self-Definition

How do politicians and administrators view the roles that they themselves perform? This has long been a controversial issue. In particular, the question of the degree to which administrators conform to the classical non-political style of behavior is often a matter of debate, both in practice and in scholarly discussion. Further, the role of politicians is a classic concern. In particular, the extent to which politicians act for the common good or alternatively orient their behavior toward satisfying particularistic or partisan interests is a matter of disagreement.

Since the data on which we rely are drawn from survey questionnaires, they clearly cannot give us a full and complete picture in this regard. Rather, we must depend on the self-reporting of our respondents. In this case, we directly asked the respondents the extent to which they agree or disagree that their conception of their role accords with a variety of role characterizations. Obviously this is not an ideal way to come at this important question. However, the approach has been used successfully in other studies (e.g., Aberbach, et al, 1981; Gunlicks, 1969), both cross-nationally and within Germany, at both the federal and local government levels. Indeed we have drawn on the Aberbach, et al study in constructing the battery of possible role conceptions used in the questionnaire.

In the Aberbach, et al battery there are nine role characterizations. With one exception, all of these were relatively easy to adopt to the present context. The eight that were not difficult to adopt included the following role descriptions: (1) technician, i.e., an expert with the specialized knowledge needed to solve problems; (2) advocate, i.e., a spokesperson for broad social groups and general societal interests; (3) facilitator, i.e., a representative of organized groups working to protect their interests; (4) broker, i.e., an intermediary between conflicting interests, or one who attempts to mediate or resolve political and interest conflicts; (5) partisan politician, i.e., one who sees herself or himself carrying out a specific partisan program; (6) trustee, i.e., one who sees her or his role as representing the town/city that one is active in; (7) legalist, i.e., one who accepts the role definition of a legal technician; (8) ombudsman, i.e., a citizen advocate who is concerned with and takes care of citizens' problems. Another is described as a (9) policy maker in the Aberbach, et al study. This, however, is difficult to bring over clearly into the German language. Indeed, the awkward phrase of "one who translates what is politically allowed" was employed. For our purposes here we will refer to this role characterization as one of being an "implementor." Finally, we added one role characterization to the battery of nine drawn from the earlier study. This is the role of an (10) initiator of new projects and problem solver, which for short-hand purposes below is referred to as initiator.

Tables 3.44 and 3.45 provide descriptive statistics on how the various elites define their roles in politics and in administration. The values given in these tables represent averages for the group categories. Given the scaling of these variables a value of 1 implies complete rejection of the notion that the elite members see themselves fulfilling such a role. A value of 3 implies neutrality toward the description, while a value of 5 entails complete acceptance of the characterization of how they see themselves.

Let us turn first to the differences and similarities that obtain across the various types of office holders in the two regions (see Table 3.44). Council members, caucus leaders, and party leaders look rather similar in both regions. There are three roles that all lean toward in an appreciably positive direction in terms of self-definition. These are the roles of advocate, ombudsman, and initiator. In addition, party leaders in the East also tend toward accepting the role of technician in their self-definition. Interestingly, all three of these classes of office holders appear to be relatively neutral toward the acceptance of the role of partisan politician. The only case here that contradicts this point, and only mildly so, is that of party leaders in the East; they seem more willing to characterize themselves in this way. The role of legalist is one that all three of these groups of office holders clearly reject. One interesting regional difference is that in the West the three groups seem to reject the characterization of facilitator while the same groups in the East are relatively neutral toward this self-definition. Across both regions the typical council members, caucus leaders, and party leaders are relatively neutral toward the role self-definitions of broker, implementor, and trustee.

The picture is markedly different for administrative department heads. The most accepted self-definition in terms of roles is that of technician. There is also a strong propensity to see oneself as an initiator and implementor. Some interesting inter-regional differences also exist. Thus, while in the West department heads take, on average, a somewhat positive stance with respect to the role of broker, those in the East are neutral toward this role. At the same time, those in the East view positively the self-description as trustee while those in the West are neutral toward this self-characterization. Something approximating neutrality holds in both regions with respect to the self-definition as legalist, ombudsman, and advocate. In both regions, there is a relatively strong rejection of the roles of facilitator and partisan politician on the part of department heads.

Holders of higher office have the largest inventory of roles that they are willing to accept in their self-definition. In the East, while there is extraordinarily high acceptance of the description of ombudsman, it is not as widely shared in the West but it still meets with positive resonance.

For both East and West, the self-description as initiator meets with very strong acceptance. Other role definitions that find acceptance in both regions include trustee (the role with the strongest acceptance in the West for this category of office holders), broker, advocate, and technician. In addition, particularly in the East, there is some acceptance of the self-definition of implementor. As with department heads, holders of higher office in both regions appear, on average, to reject the role descriptions of facilitator, partisan politician, and legalist.

In terms of inter-party differences, the focus here is exclusively on council members (see Table 3.45). Although there are some interesting inter-regional differences, most of the major variation that obtains here is to be seen across the parties. Two roles are uniformly identified with by council members of all political persuasions; these include the role of advocate and that of ombudsman. This holds in both the East and the West. One role that members of all political parties identify strongly within in the West is that of an initiator. This is a role that meets with positive, though lower resonance among the parties in the East. Close to neutrality on this are the members of the Bündnis 90/Grünen, the FDP, and the PDS. The role of technician meets with strong resonance in both regions only among members of the smaller parties and electoral groups. In addition, non-party council members in the West and FDP member in the East (this latter group to a very high degree) identify with the self-description of technician.

The role of facilitator finds little resonance in the West, particularly among the council members not affiliated with any political party; in the East, there is a very mixed picture with respect to this role. Some are quite neutral, i.e., the Bündnis 90/Grünen and the PDS, some reject it, the Union, FDP and SPD, and the remaining groups resonate positively to this role. The role of broker is one that finds some positive acceptance among the parties in the West, although the member of the Bündnis 90/Grünen tend to reject it. In the East the broker role finds acceptance, and indeed relatively strong acceptance, only among the members of the FDP and those not affiliated with any political party or electoral group. Interestingly, there is a mixture of rejection and neutrality with respect to both the roles of partisan politician and implementor. The role of trustee finds generally widespread acceptance among the parties in the West but is clearly rejected by the members of the Bündnis 90/Grünen. In the East this role finds strong acceptance only among the members of the Union and those not affiliated with political parties or electoral groups. Otherwise it is met with at best neutrality or rejection as in the case of both the Bündnis 90/Grünen and the PDS. Finally, there is uniform rejection in both regions for the role of legalist amongst council members of all political hues.

Accounting for Self-Definition

One of the major objectives of this paper is to account for the differences in role orientations that exist among the local political elites. Obviously, the large number of role definitions and the variations therein that have just been described make this difficult to do. In order to resolve this problem we have employed the following strategy. First, we attempted to ascertain whether (1) there exists a smaller number of underlying dimensions that capture the major variation in the role definition variables and (2) whether these dimensions could be given a meaningful interpretation. Second, having succeeded in identifying these dimension, we went on to determine the extent to which the nature of one's public office, one's political party affiliation, and a variety of personal characteristics contribute to systematic variation in these principal role definitions.

Table 3.46 describes the results of the principal components analysis of the ten specific role definition variables. The results, seen from a statistical perspective, are satisfactory. Approximately 50 percent of the variation is captured by the three components with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. In addition, there is generally clear delineation between the components in that most individual variables load very heavily on only one of the factors.

Substantively, the three dimensions that emerge allow for a plausible and intuitive interpretation. The first dimension has four variables that load principally on it. The two leading elements, the role of technician and that of legalist, clearly suggest a traditional administrative orientation. The other two terms, broker and trustee, do not contradict this interpretation. Indeed, both role descriptions neatly fit the kinds of orientations that one would expect of an individual carrying out public administrative duties and functions.

The second dimension appears to reflect mainly the characteristics of an individual committed to representing and serving the broad and non-partisan interests of the community in which she/he holds public office. The two dominant variables, in terms of their loadings on this component, are those of an advocate, or one who acts as a spokesperson for the general social interests and broad social groupings, and that of ombudsman, one who works to deal with the problems and interests of the average citizen. The two other terms that load principally on this dimension, initiator and facilitator, also have relatively strong connections to one or another of the other principal dimensions. Thus, the initiator role, a role of one who starts new projects and acts as a problem-solver, is also strongly connected to the general administrative dimension described above. The fourth term, facilitator, a role which suggests that the individual sees

her/himself as serving the interests or organized groups (a more particularistic orientation) is also strongly linked to the third principal dimension, which will be described below. On the whole, though, this second dimension essentially appears to tap into a general role orientation that while political is also non-partisan.

The third dimension reflects principally two terms. The one, which we have described as the role of implementor, refers to the role of an individual who implements what is politically allowed. The second is the partisan politician role. As noted previously, the implementor role is difficult to interpret. On the whole, though, this dimension does seem to reflect the orientation of one engaged in partisan political activity.

In a preliminary effort at determining the factors that shape the elite members' role orientations, we have used three sets of explanatory variables that may have an influence on self-definition. First, of course, we include a set of binary variables representing the type of political and/or administrative office that the elite member holds. Clearly, we can expect that purely political offices will lead individuals toward rejecting the administrative role orientation while those holding administrative offices will be more prone to having such an orientation. On the other hand, we would expect that administrative office holders would shy away from identifying with either political role orientation (non-partisan and partisan) while those with political/electoral offices would, to varying degrees, feel more comfortable with such descriptions of their roles in local governance.

A second set of factors has been introduced to reveal the extent to which partisan affiliation influences the acceptance of different types of roles. Again, binary variables capturing whether or not the individual is a member of one or another political party have been employed. No variable has been introduced for individuals without party affiliation. This means that the coefficient on any party variable captures the distance between an elite member of that party and an elite member without party membership. The influence that non-membership in any political party has is captured in the constant term of the equation.

Finally, a set of background variables that might influence role orientation has been introduced into the regression equation. Two groupings within this set reflect the family-class background of the individuals and the kind of occupational training that the elite member has had. Both groupings are composed of binary variables. In the first grouping, we include two variables. One reflects whether the individual comes from a family where the father's occupation was in the managerial or professional class ("upper"). The other reflects whether the father was a

worker ("lower"). The second grouping is composed of six binary variables. Three of these six training variables specify that the training was at university, while the other three specify that the training was outside of the university. For each type of training locus, there are three binary categories: "administrative" (e.g., law, administration, etc.), "technical", or "social" (including, for example, the humanities, social work, etc.).

A binary variable registering whether the individual is from the West or the East is included here as is another binary variable for gender. In addition, the age of the individual is included. Lastly, we have introduced a term meant to capture the degree to which the individual is linked to her/his community. This is a variable that represents the count of the number of types of associations in which the individual is a member.

The same specification was used for all three role orientation variables, and takes the following general form:

$$Role_{i,j} = \lambda_{1,i} + \lambda_{2,i}O_{i,j} + \lambda_{3,i}P_{i,j} + \lambda_{4,i}B_{i,j} + e_{i,j}$$

where:

Role_{i,j} = specific role i for individual j,

$\lambda_{1,i}, \lambda_{2,i}, \lambda_{3,i}, \lambda_{4,i}$ = Vectors of regression coefficients for role i,

O_{i,j} = vector of office variables for role i and individual j,

P_{i,j} = vector of party affiliation variables for role i and individual j,

B_{i,j} = vector of background variables (family class, training, region, gender, age, associational ties) for role i and individual j,

e_{i,j} = error term for role i and individual j.

The results of the regression analyses using this specification are provided in Tables 3.47 through 3.49. The fits of the estimated equations are reasonably good, with the adjusted R² varying from approximately 29 percent for the administrative role orientation variable, to 25 percent for the partisan politician role orientation variable, and to 22 percent for the non-partisan political role orientation variable.

Let us turn to examine the specific effects estimated for the equation dealing with the administrative role orientation (see Table 3.47). Four of the five office or position variables have statistically significant effect in the variation in the acceptance of the administrative role orientation. The most marked effects of office or position are to be found for both department

heads and holders of higher office. The coefficients on these terms are both large and positive, implying greater acceptance of this description of the role that these individuals play in local governance. There is a much lower coefficient for the caucus leaders and given the negative effect registered for council members, this means that the total impact of holding this kind of office is approximately zero. The effect of being a council member but not simultaneously a caucus leader is statistically significant and negative. No effect is registered for the office of party leader on this role orientation variable.

All of the partisan variables, with but two exceptions, that for the terms for members of the CDU/CSU and the smaller parties and electoral groups, have statistically significant and negative coefficients, implying rejection of this role orientation (at least relative to those without any party affiliation). This is most marked among the Republikan, the PDS, and the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen partisans. Relative to these parties' members, the SPD and FDP members only moderately reject this description of their role.

There is a weak and negative relationship between one of the class variables, that for elite members from families in the managerial/professional class, and this role orientation. Among the training variables, two of the three relating to university training register a strong positive impact. Those with such training in either technical or administrative fields have a greater propensity to accept the administrative self-description role. Among those with non-university training only those with technical training register a significant and positive (though less than those with a comparable training at the university level) in this equation.

Interestingly, there is no statistically discernible effect registered for the regional variable. In other words, there is no difference between local elite members in the New Federal States and those in the Old in terms of acceptance or rejection of the administrative role orientation. However, both gender and age play a part in shaping here with females (in part one can assume because so few actually hold administrative offices) having a discernibly lower tendency toward accepting this role orientation, and with age heightening the willingness to accept this orientation. Finally, we see that the scope of ties one has with one's community, as registered by the variable capturing association membership, heightens the acceptance of this role orientation.

Turning to the non-partisan political role orientation, see Table 3.48, one sees that both the office and partisan affiliation sets of variables are much diminished in their impacts. Only one office variable, that of administrative department head, weighs in with an appreciable impact on the willingness to accept this role definition. In this case, one sees that this category of elite office

holders is quite unwilling to present themselves in such a role. Only two of the partisan affiliation terms are statistically significant, at least at the .10 level. The impact registered for the SPD members is moderate, positive, but weakly significant. The impact is much stronger here for those individuals connected to smaller parties and electoral groups. These elites seem more willing to accept this characterization as an appropriate description of the role they play in local governance.

Neither of the family-class background variables appears to influence the willingness to accept this role definition. With respect to the training background of these individuals, one sees that it is only those with training, regardless of whether at the university or outside the university, in the non-administrative and non-technical fields, that register any significant difference in their acceptance of this role description; in both cases such a background appears to increase the willingness to accept this role definition.

Again, there are no differences between elites from the New Federal States and those from the Old. Age plays a role in the willingness to accept the characterization of a non-partisan politician with older people more prone to accept this definition of themselves than are younger people. Finally, associational affiliation appears to play part in the willingness to see one's self as filling such a role. As with the administrative role, wider associational ties heightens the acceptance of the role of non-partisan politician.

Let us now turn to the last role orientation, that of partisan politician (see Table 3.49). The office one holds appears to play a significant part in shaping acceptance or rejection of this role orientation. Administrative department heads appear to be very unwilling to describe themselves in this way. While the impact of holding higher office also lowers the willingness to accept this characterization of one's role in local governance, the estimated effect is lower than that found for departmental heads. Not surprisingly, being a local party leader pushes one toward acceptance of this role definition. This is less the case with council members. Interestingly, caucus leaders are not appreciably more willing to accept this characterization of their roles than are other council members. The willingness to accept this role definition is clearly larger for most political party elites, relative to those possessing no party affiliation. This is most marked in the case of SPD members as well as Union members. However, neither the Republikaner nor those affiliated with the PDS are distinguishable (at least statistically) from those aligned with no party. Members of smaller parties and electoral groups strongly reject this role definition.

Family class background again appears to have no particular effect. All of the training variables register relatively strong, and negative impacts on the willingness to accept this role definition. None of the other background variables appears to have an effect on the willingness to accept the partisan politician role orientation.

Conclusion

The findings reported here, taken in conjunction with those of Aberback et al (1981) and Hoffmann-Lange (1992), suggest that local political/administrative elites are less prone than those at higher levels of government in Germany to come from privileged backgrounds. Nonetheless, they conform to the "law of increasing disproportion" that mark the hierarchy of elites worldwide. Less privileged, more representative, at least in terms of class backgrounds, than those in analogous position at higher levels of government, these elites still have backgrounds that make it clear that they do not conform to the democratic image of a governing elite. Their class-origins are largely working class, though not completely in conformity with the society from which they have emerged. They are much more likely, at least relative to the general population, to have had a university education. This latter characteristic is particularly pronounced in the New Federal States. More than the general population, though clearly less than elites at the federal level, a goodly number also come from families where the parents were involved in politics or official life.

Still, these elites do not conform to an image of a local governing class where dominance of the local scene passes from one generation to the next. Indeed, most spring from places outside of the communities in which they now serve in public office. Here, again, it should be noted that at least at this level of government there is no evidence to support the notion that the East has been "colonized" by the West. The form of government that mark cities and towns in the New Federal States clearly derives from the West (indeed all five of the New Federal States have adopted the South German Council constitutional form for local government) the personnel that have taken up elective and appointive office are overwhelmingly natives of the former GDR and neither transplants nor carpetbaggers from the West. In addition, while overwhelmingly not natives of these communities, most of the members of these elites, both East and West, have spent significant proportions of their lives in these towns and cities.

In the West many members of these elites have long years of experiences in politics and/or public administration. Indeed, quite a large number have served for extensive periods of time in the offices that they presently hold. The picture in the East is starkly different for the most part. Outside of the PDS, and to some extent the two former block parties of the GDR, viz., the CDU and the FDP, the elite members are quite new to official life and have held both party membership and political/administrative office for only a short period of time.

Demographically, the local government elites in both East and West share many of the characteristics of their peers in other long-established democracies as well in those systems that have recently emerged within the post-communist countries of central Europe (Baldersheim, et al, in press). These elites are typically male and middle-aged. On average they have a far greater likelihood of having had a university education than their fellow citizens and are more likely to hold professional and white-collar jobs. In sum, they are not especially representative of the socio-economic patterns that characterize their communities.

Nevertheless, they are clearly well integrated within their communities. Typically long-time residents, they have a wide range of associational ties, though these more oft than not reflect the political orientations of the parties of which they are members, and a large number of individuals and groups within the community upon whom they rely.

We have seen that these elite members define themselves in terms of three distinct political/administrative roles. For the most part, the constraints of the offices that they hold play an important role in this self-definition. Party affiliation is sometimes important as well. Class background seems to be unimportant in shaping role orientation but training background does play a role to varying extents. No independent effect was discovered that would allow one to distinguish between elites members in the New Federal States and those from the Old. An important variable in shaping orientation toward non-partisan and non-political orientations is the breadth of associational affiliation.

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Table 3.1
Place of Birth by Office
(percentage of category)

		In the Same Town	In the Same Region	In the Same State	Elsewhere in East Germany	Elsewhere in West Germany	Former German East	Overseas	No Answer
Entire Sample	East	35.0	14.0	12.3	21.9	6.8	8.7	0.7	0.6
	West	37.0	18.2	15.8	4.7	14.4	7.6	1.6	0.6
Council Members	East	39.2	14.5	12.7	21.0	4.3	7.7	0.6	0.0
	West	42.8	17.5	10.2	5.0	15.1	7.8	1.3	0.3
Caucus Leaders	East	32.6	16.3	12.0	22.8	8.7	7.6	0.0	0.0
	West	48.8	16.7	13.1	3.6	13.1	3.6	1.2	0.0
Party Leaders	East	25.3	20.0	14.7	33.3	1.3	4.0	0.0	1.3
	West	33.8	22.5	18.8	2.5	11.3	7.5	2.5	1.3
Department Heads	East	30.1	14.0	12.9	18.3	15.1	8.6	0.0	1.1
	West	26.1	23.5	21.7	6.1	12.2	8.7	1.7	0.0
Higher Office	East	33.0	7.4	9.6	22.3	10.6	13.8	2.4	1.6
	West	20.6	12.1	25.0	4.8	14.5	8.9	2.4	1.6

Table 3.2
Moved From West to East After the "Wende" By Office

	<hr/> East <hr/>
Entire Sample	5.7
Council Members	2.2
Caucus Leaders	3.3
Party Leaders	0.0
Department Heads	15.1
Higher Office	10.1

Table 3.3
Place of Birth by Party Affiliation
(percentage of category)

		In the Same Town	In the Same Region	In the Same State	Elsewhere in East Germany	Elsewhere in West Germany	Former German East	Overseas	No Answer
Bündnis 90/Grünen	East	28.6	23.8	4.8	31.0	7.1	4.8	0.0	0.0
	West	19.7	22.7	31.8	1.5	21.2	0.0	3.0	0.0
Union	East	39.5	10.1	10.1	19.4	7.8	10.9	1.6	0.0
	West	44.3	20.9	10.4	4.5	10.4	8.0	1.5	0.0
FDP	East	32.1	14.3	7.1	28.6	10.7	7.1	0.0	0.0
	West	41.2	8.8	14.7	2.9	23.5	8.8	0.0	0.0
PDS	East	31.2	16.1	23.7	23.7	0.0	4.3	1.1	0.0
	West	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
SPD	East	38.3	10.6	9.9	19.1	7.8	13.5	0.0	0.7
	West	36.3	17.7	10.2	7.0	16.3	10.2	1.9	0.5
Other	East	36.0	20.0	16.0	20.0	0.0	8.0	0.0	0.0
	West	36.1	8.3	30.6	5.6	11.1	2.8	2.8	2.8
None	East	34.8	17.4	10.1	20.3	13.0	2.9	0.0	1.4
	West	35.4	13.8	26.2	2.1	13.8	7.7	0.0	0.0

Table 3.4
Moved From West to East After the "Wende" By Party

	East
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	4.8
Union	6.2
FDP	3.6
PDS	0.0
SPD	8.5
Other	0.0
None	11.6

Table 3.5
Average Length of Residence in City Where Office Held
(Proportion of Life Spent in City)
By Office

	East	West
Entire Sample	.64	.69
Council Members	.69	.74
Caucus Leaders	.64	.76
Party Leaders	.60	.62
Department Heads	.55	.63
Higher Office	.59	.63

Table 3.6
Average Length of Residence in City Where Office Held
(Proportion of Life Spent in City)
By Party Afiliation

	East	West
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	.60	.56
Union	.68	.78
FDP	.67	.65
PDS	.61	NA
SPD	.65	.69
Other	.71	.68
None	.56	.59

Table 3.7
 Non-Natives' Average Length of Residence in City Where Office Held
 (Proportion of **Adult** Life Spent in City)
 By Office

	East	West
Entire Sample	.72	.76
Council Members	.78	.80
Caucus Leaders	.78	.82
Party Leaders	.75	.72
Department Heads	.62	.73
Higher Office	.66	.71

Table 3.8
 Non-Natives' Average Length of Residence in City Where Office Held
 (Proportion of **Adult** Life Spent in City)
 By Party Affiliation

	East	West
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	.70	.73
Union	.71	.82
FDP	.74	.76
PDS	.74	NA
SPD	.65	.77
Other	.72	.73
None	.64	.64

Table 3.9
Average Age By Office
(rounded to nearest year)

	East	West
Entire Sample	47	50
Council Members	47	50
Caucus Leaders	46	49
Party Leaders	45	48
Department Heads	45	49
Higher Office	48	52

Table 3.10
Average Age By Party Afiliation
(rounded to nearest year)

	East	West
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	45	42
Union	47	51
FDP	49	54
PDS	46	NA
SPD	48	51
Other	50	52
None	45	48

Table 3.11a
Average Number of Years in
Politics/Administration By Office
(figures in parentheses for the East represent
the percentage that entered
politics/administration in 1989 or later)

	East	West
Entire Sample	8.6 (76%)	18.6
Council Members	8.8 (76%)	17.8
Caucus Leaders	7.9 (79%)	18.2
Party Leaders	7.8 (81%)	15.1
Department Heads	8.4 (72%)	22.6
Higher Office	7.4 (80%)	21.1

Table 3.11b
Average Number of Years in
Present Office*

	East:		West:	
	Years in Present Position	Years in Present Position as Percent of Tenure in Politics/ Administration	Years in Present Position	Years in Present Position as Percent of Tenure in Politics/ Administration
Council Members	3.1	59.6	9.5	54.9
Caucus Leaders	2.8	51.7	6.4	36.5
Party Leaders	3.3	58.4	5.6	45.8
Department Heads	3.9	65.5	10.2	45.1
Higher Office	3.4	61.5	9.7	45.1

* -- Categorization by office based on respondent's answer to the question: "What is your main political/public office?"

Table 3.12a
Average Number of Years in
Politics/Administration By Party Affiliation
(figures in parentheses for the East represent
the percentage that entered
politics/administration in 1989 or later)

	East	West
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	6.7 (88%)	11.3
Union	8.9 (71%)	19.1
FDP	11.3 (64%)	18.9
PDS	14.5 (48%)	NA
SPD	5.9 (94%)	20.6
Other	4.1 (100%)	15.7
None	6.6 (80%)	21.3

Table 3.12b
Average Number of Years in
Present Office* by Political Party
(Council Members Only)

	East:		West:	
	Years in Present Position	Years in Present Position as Percent of Tenure in Politics/ Administration	Years in Present Position	Years in Present Position as Percent of Tenure in Politics/ Administration
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	3.8	78.5	3.2	49.1
Union	3.2	58.6	9.9	58.4
FDP	9.4	78.5	9.1	43.0
PDS	2.8	42.7	---	---
SPD	2.4	61.5	11.2	52.7
Other	3.2	84.8	8.7	67.4
None	2.4	66.1	7.6	71.4

* -- Categorization by office based on respondent's answer to the question: "What is your main political/public office?"

Age and Tenure in Local Government Differences Between Parties and Regions




Table 3.13
 Proportion of Adult Life Spent in Politics/Administration,
 Native and Non-Native Elites, By Office

	East Natives	East Non-Natives	West Natives	West Non-Natives
Entire Sample	.32	.34	.68	.59
Council Members	.32	.34	.67	.55
Caucus Leaders	.35	.32	.68	.60
Party Leaders	.31	.33	.61	.55
Department Heads	.33	.35	.87	.72
Higher Office	.26	.28	.69	.61

Table 3.14
 Proportion of Adult Life Spent in Politics/Administration,
 Native and Non-Native Elites, By Party Affiliation

	East Natives	East Non-Natives	West Natives	West Non-Natives
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	.24	.30	.45	.56
Union	.34	.35	.69	.59
FDP	.45	.31	.59	.50
PDS	.51	.54	NA	NA
SPD	.26	.22	.74	.63
Other	.11	.20	.49	.52
None	.24	.34	.78	.69

Table 3.15
 Year Joined Political Party by Office Held (Only
 Those Who are Party Members): Averages (Rounded to Nearest Year)
 (Figures in Parentheses for East are Percentages
 of Those Who Joined Party in 1989 or After)

	East	West
Entire Sample	1985 (69%)	1976
Council Members	1985 (72%)	1975
Caucus Leaders	1985 (68%)	1975
Party Leaders	1985 (72%)	1980
Department Heads	1986 (66%)	1975
Higher Office	1983 (66%)	1973

Table 3.16
 Year Joined Political Party by Party
 Affiliation: Averages (Rounded to Nearest Year)
 (Figures in Parentheses for East are Percentages
 of Those Who Joined Party in 1989 or After)

	East	West
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	1991 (95%)	1985
Union	1982 (50%)	1975
FDP	1979 (42%)	1976
PDS	1980 (52%)	NA
SPD	1989 (94%)	1972
Other	1991 (100%)	1986
None	NA	NA

Table 3.17
 Parents Were in Politics or Official Positions
 in Terms of Political/Administrative Function
 (in percentages)

	Father	Mother	Both Parents	Neither	No Answer
<hr/>					
Entire Sample					
East	14.4	2.6	2.2	78.6	2.2
West	16.3	1.3	2.8	76.4	3.2
Council Members					
East	12.0	2.5	2.5	81.2	1.9
West	16.2	1.8	2.9	76.0	3.1
Caucus Leaders					
East	13.0	2.3	4.3	78.3	2.2
West	15.5	2.4	3.6	77.4	1.2
Party Leaders					
East	14.7	2.7	5.3	76.0	1.3
West	12.5	3.8	2.5	76.3	5.0
Department Heads					
East	18.3	2.2	2.2	74.2	3.2
West	20.9	0.0	1.7	73.0	4.3
Higher Office					
East	17.0	3.2	0.0	79.1	3.2
West	12.9	0.0	4.9	81.5	1.6
<hr/>					

Table 3.18
 Parents Were in Politics or Official Positions
 in Terms of Party Affiliation
 (in percentages)

	Father	Mother	Both Parents	Neither	No Answer
Bündnis 90/ Grünen					
East	9.5	0.0	7.1	83.3	0.0
West	12.1	4.5	3.0	80.3	0.0
Union					
East	16.3	2.3	0.0	79.8	1.6
West	12.4	1.0	2.5	80.1	4.0
FDP					
East	7.1	0.0	3.6	85.7	3.6
West	14.7	0.0	2.9	73.5	8.8
PDS					
East	18.3	3.2	5.4	69.9	3.2
West	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
SPD					
East	9.9	3.5	1.4	84.9	1.4
West	18.6	1.4	3.7	73.5	2.8
Other					
East	20.0	4.0	0.0	76.0	0.0
West	30.6	0.0	2.8	66.7	0.0
No Party Affiliation					
East	18.8	2.9	1.4	73.9	2.9
West	20.0	0.0	1.5	76.9	1.5

Table 3.19
Father's Last Occupation by Office

Occupational Category	Entire Sample		Council Members		Caucus Leaders		Party Leaders		Department Heads		Higher Office	
	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	1.6
Public Service:												
-- Education and Science, Professional	7.7	3.8	8.3	2.9	9.8	4.8	12.0	5.0	3.2	4.3	11.3	6.5
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	2.2	4.3	1.5	4.7	0.0	8.3	6.7	3.8	1.1	2.6	1.4	6.5
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	2.9	1.0	4.6	0.8	6.5	1.2	2.7	0.0	1.1	0.9	0.0	3.2
-- Other, Not Specified	1.8	7.6	1.5	7.3	1.1	7.1	0.0	8.8	4.3	7.0	1.4	16.2
Private Sector:												
-- Self-Employed and Managers	5.3	7.8	5.2	8.9	4.3	10.7	5.3	12.3	7.5	3.5	1.4	6.5
-- Professionals	8.8	5.5	7.7	5.5	6.5	4.8	12.0	1.3	6.5	7.0	8.5	0.0
-- Skilled Workers	36.3	38.7	36.8	41.4	39.1	26.2	41.3	33.8	39.8	39.1	32.3	33.8
-- Non-Skilled Workers	8.4	10.5	7.7	10.2	5.4	9.5	4.0	12.5	10.8	12.2	7.0	8.1
Not Employed	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.6	2.2	2.4	0.0	1.3	1.1	1.7	0.0	0.0
Unclear, No Answer	24.6	19.2	16.5	24.8	25.0	25.0	14.7	21.3	24.7	21.7	32.4	19.4

Table 3.20
Father's Last Occupation by Party, East

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Public Service:							
-- Education and Science, Professional	16.7	9.3	0.0	5.3	6.4	12.0	5.8
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	2.4	0.8	7.1	3.2	2.1	0.0	2.9
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	4.8	1.6	0.0	6.3	2.1	4.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	2.4	2.3	0.0	1.1	2.1	4.0	2.9
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	7.1	3.1	17.9	2.1	4.3	8.0	10.1
-- Professionals	11.9	7.8	7.1	6.3	11.3	16.0	7.2
-- Skilled Workers	28.6	45.7	28.6	33.7	34.8	24.0	40.6
-- Non-Skilled Workers	9.5	6.2	10.7	10.5	7.8	8.0	11.6
Not Employed	0.0	0.8	0.0	3.2	0.7	0.0	0.0
Unclear, No Answer	16.7	20.9	28.6	27.4	29.1	24.0	18.8

Table 3.21
Father's Last Occupation by Party, West

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	0.0	0.5	0.0	---	0.0	2.8	0.0
Public Service:							
-- Education and Science, Professional	13.6	2.5	2.9	---			
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	3.0	3.0	2.9	---	5.6	8.3	4.6
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	0.0	1.0	0.0	---	1.4	0.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	9.1	8.5	5.9	---	9.3	5.6	1.5
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	3.0	10.4	14.7	---	6.5	5.6	4.6
-- Professionals	13.6	4.5	2.9	---	6.0	5.6	1.5
-- Skilled Workers	25.8	46.3	35.3	---	37.2	38.9	36.9
-- Non-Skilled Workers	9.1	6.0	8.8	---	14.0	5.6	16.9
Not Employed	3.0	0.5	2.9	---	1.4	0.0	1.5
Unclear, No Answer	19.7	16.9	23.5	---	16.7	25.0	24.6

Table 3.22
 Father's Last Occupation by Party, Council Members, East

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Public Service:							
- Education and Science, Professional	18.2	7.8	0.0	5.0	7.4	14.3	11.1
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	4.5	0.0	0.0	2.5	1.1	0.0	11.1
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	9.1	1.3	0.0	7.2	3.2	4.8	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	4.5	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.1	4.8	0.0
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	4.5	3.9	33.3	1.3	6.4	4.8	11.1
-- Professionals	4.5	9.1	8.3	6.3	7.4	19.0	0.0
-- Skilled Workers	27.0	48.1	33.3	30.0	37.2	23.8	55.6
-- Non-Skilled Workers	13.6	3.9	16.7	11.3	7.4	4.8	0.0
Not Employed	0.0	1.3	0.0	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unclear, No Answer	13.6	22.1	8.3	31.3	28.7	23.8	11.1

Table 3.23
 Father's Last Occupation by Party, Council Members, West

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	0.0	0.0	0.0	---	0.0	5.0	0.0
Public Service:							
-- Education and Science, Professional	10.3	2.9	4.8	---	1.3	0.0	0.0
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	5.1	3.7	0.0	---	5.9	10.0	0.0
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	0.0	0.7	0.0	---	1.3	0.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	7.7	7.4	4.8	---	7.8	10.0	0.0
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	2.6	0.3	23.8	---	7.8	5.0	0.0
-- Professionals	15.4	3.7	0.0	---	5.9	5.0	0.0
-- Skilled Workers	23.1	49.3	33.3	---	40.5	40.0	33.3
-- Non-Skilled Workers	7.7	5.9	9.5	---	14.4	10.0	16.7
Not Employed	5.1	0.0	4.8	---	2.9	0.0	0.0
Unclear, No Answer	23.1	16.2	19.0	---	13.1	15.0	50.0

Table 3.24
 Higher Education Completed by Office
 Percentage of Respondents with College or
 University Degree by Office

	East	West
Entire Sample	59.3	44.0
Council Members	52.2	41.3
Caucus Leaders	62.0	54.8
Party Leaders	65.3	41.3
Department Heads	68.8	47.0
Higher Office	69.1	50.0

Table 3.25
 Higher Education Completed by Party
 Percentage of Respondents with College or
 University Degree by Party Affiliation

	East	West
Bündnis 90/ Grünen	76.2	72.7
Union	51.9	36.8
FDP	71.4	55.9
PDS	62.4	NA
SPD	56.7	41.4
Other	44.0	33.3
None	66.7	50.8

Table 3.26
 Higher Education and Family Background
 (Percent with University Education Broken down by
 General Categories of Father's Last Principal Occupation)

	East	West
Total	59.3	44.0
Father's Occupational Class:		
Higher	70.4	66.2
Lower	50.8	34.9
Other	63.8	44.1

Higher:

- Politician, etc.
- Public, Education and Science Professional
- Public, Traditional Professional
- Private Self-Employed or Manager
- Private Professional

Lower:

- Public, Worker
- Private, Skilled Worker
- Private, Unskilled Worker

Other:

- Public, Not Specified
- No Work
- Not Clear, No Answer

Table 3.27
Training Background by Office*

Training Category	Entire Sample		Council Members		Caucus Leaders		Party Leaders		Department Heads		Higher Office	
	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
University Training:												
-- Law, Administration, Economics, Social Sciences	7.2	18.9	3.7	11.8	2.2	20.2	6.7	12.5	16.1	34.8	15.5	38.7
-- Technical, Mathematical, Natural Sciences, Medical	27.3	10.9	25.8	9.2	32.6	10.7	30.7	12.5	30.1	16.5	31.0	14.5
-- Education, Humanities, Social Work, Library Science	14.3	15.5	13.2	20.7	19.6	26.2	14.7	15.0	17.2	5.2	11.3	11.3
-- Other, Not Specified	0.6	0.2	0.9	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0
Non-University Training:												
-- Banking, Public Administration, Legal	8.1	28.2	7.1	26.4	3.3	26.2	4.0	31.3	12.9	33.9	9.9	19.4
-- Technical, Medical, Engineering	37.1	19.8	42.9	25.1	39.1	10.7	41.3	23.8	20.4	4.3	26.8	12.9
-- Social, Educational	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.1	2.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	4.2	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	2.0	2.1	3.1	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.4	0.0
Still In Training, Education	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
NA	1.8	2.4	1.5	2.1	1.1	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.2	1.7	1.4	0.0

* -- Note that some respondents reported training in two fields. The data here refer to the first training field supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.28
Training Background by Party, East

Training Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
University Training							
-- Law, Administration, Economics, and Social Science	9.5	9.3	3.6	2.1	5.7	0.0	15.9
-- Technical, Mathematical, Natural Sciences, Medical	35.7	27.1	39.3	20.0	27.0	40.0	26.1
-- Education, Humanities, Social Work, Library Science	11.9	8.5	17.9	22.1	14.2	8.0	15.9
-- Other, Not Specified	2.4	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-University Training:							
-- Banking, Public Administration, Legal	0.0	10.9	10.7	4.2	7.8	4.0	11.6
-- Technical, Medical, Engineering	40.5	37.2	21.4	41.1	41.1	44.0	26.1
-- Social, Educational	0.0	2.3	0.0	3.2	0.7	4.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	0.0	3.1	3.6	3.2	2.1	0.0	0.0
Still in Training, Education	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0
NA	0.0	1.6	3.6	2.1	0.7	0.0	4.3

* -- Note that some respondents reported training in two fields. The data here refer to the first training field supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.29
Training Background by Party, West

Training Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
University Training:							
-- Law, Administration, Economics, and Social Science	21.2	15.9	26.5	---	17.7	13.9	30.8
-- Technical, Mathematical, Natural Sciences, Medical	16.7	10.4	14.7	---	6.5	8.3	20.0
-- Education, Humanities, Social Work, Library Science	33.3	10.0	11.8	---	18.6	22.2	6.2
-- Other, Not Specified	0.0	0.0	0.0	---	0.0	0.0	1.5
Non-University Training:							
-- Banking, Public Administration, Legal	7.6	34.8	29.4	---	25.1	27.8	35.4
-- Technical, Medical, Engineering	13.6	22.4	17.6	---	23.7	22.2	4.6
-- Social, Educational	4.5	0.5	0.0	---	2.3	0.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	0.0	4.0	0.0	---	1.9	2.8	0.0
Still in Training, Education	0.0	2.0	0.0	---	0.9	0.0	0.0
NA	3.0	1.0	0.0	---	3.3	2.8	1.5

* -- Note that some respondents reported training in two fields. The data here refer to the first training field supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.30
Training Background by Party, Council Members, East

Training Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
University Training							
-- Law, Administration, Economics, and Social Science	0.0	3.9	0.0	2.5	6.4	0.0	0.0
-- Technical, Mathematical, Natural Sciences, Medical	31.8	29.9	33.3	22.5	21.3	38.1	22.2
-- Education, Humanities, Social Work, Library Science	9.1	9.1	16.7	21.3	12.8	4.8	11.1
-- Other, Not Specified	4.5	0.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-University Training:							
-- Banking, Public Administration, Legal	0.0	7.8	8.3	5.0	8.5	4.8	11.1
-- Technical, Medical, Engineering	54.5	41.6	33.3	36.3	46.8	47.6	44.4
-- Social, Educational	0.0	1.3	0.0	3.8	0.0	4.8	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	0.0	5.2	8.3	3.8	2.1	0.0	0.0
Still in Training, Education	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.0
NA	0.0	1.3	0.0	2.5	1.1	0.0	11.1

* -- Note that some respondents reported training in two fields. The data here refer to the first training field supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.31
Training Background by Party, Council Members, West

Training Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
University Training							
-- Law, Administration, Economics, and Social Science	15.4	11.0	28.6	---	9.2	15.0	16.7
-- Technical, Mathematical, Natural Sciences, Medical	12.8	11.0	14.3	---	5.9	5.0	0.0
-- Education, Humanities, Social Work, Library Science	46.2	11.8	14.3	---	22.9	30.0	16.7
-- Other, Not Specified	0.0	0.0	0.0	---	0.0	0.0	0.0
Non-University Training:							
-- Banking, Public Administration, Legal	10.3	33.1	23.8	---	24.8	20.0	33.3
-- Technical, Medical, Engineering	10.3	25.7	19.0	---	29.4	25.0	33.3
-- Social, Educational	5.1	0.7	0.0	---	2.6	0.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	0.0	3.7	0.0	---	2.0	0.0	0.0
Still in Training, Education	0.0	1.5	0.0	---	0.7	0.0	0.0
NA	0.0	1.5	0.0	---	2.6	5.0	0.0

* -- Note that some respondents reported training in two fields. The data here refer to the first training field supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.32
Main Occupation by Office*

Occupational Category	Entire Sample		Council Members		Caucus Leaders		Party Leaders		Department Heads		Higher Office	
	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East	West
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	4.4	6.0	2.5	3.9	2.2	8.3	8.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	25.4	37.1
Public Service:												
-- Education and Science, Professional	8.1	9.7	11.0	13.1	17.4	11.9	10.7	11.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	29.4	23.5	9.8	10.7	9.8	15.5	16.0	12.5	81.7	69.6	63.4	24.2
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	5.3	2.5	4.0	2.9	4.3	1.2	4.0	2.5	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	2.0	9.2	0.6	6.3	1.1	3.6	2.7	6.3	16.2	27.8	2.8	4.8
Private Sector:												
-- Self-Employed and Managers	12.3	10.9	17.5	13.9	19.6	21.4	13.3	15.0	0.0	0.0	1.4	6.5
-- Professionals	9.5	7.1	13.2	9.4	20.7	14.3	13.3	3.8	0.0	0.0	1.4	1.6
-- Skilled Workers	10.8	13.2	15.3	16.5	13.0	7.1	12.0	18.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5
-- Non-Skilled Workers	0.4	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.0	2.4	2.7	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
Not Employed	13.8	13.8	19.6	18.8	7.6	11.9	13.3	13.3	0.0	0.0	1.4	12.9
Unclear, No Answer	4.0	3.5	5.8	3.4	4.3	2.4	4.0	2.5	2.2	2.6	0.0	1.6

* -- Note that some respondents reported more than one main occupation. The data here refer to the first occupation supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.33
Main Occupation by Party, East*

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	0.0	7.0	7.1	3.2	5.0	4.0	1.4
Public Service:							
-- Education and Science, Professional	11.9	6.2	3.6	20.0	6.4	4.0	1.4
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	28.6	31.0	35.7	6.3	24.8	16.0	69.6
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	4.8	6.2	0.0	1.1	5.7	4.0	11.6
-- Other, Not Specified	4.8	1.6	3.6	1.1	2.8	0.0	1.4
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	14.3	13.2	21.4	6.3	17.0	12.0	2.9
-- Professionals	19.0	7.0	14.3	13.7	7.1	16.0	4.3
-- Skilled Workers	9.5	15.5	7.1	9.5	13.5	8.0	1.4
-- Non-Skilled Workers	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Not Employed	7.1	9.3	3.6	31.6	14.2	28.0	1.4
Unclear, No Answer	0.0	2.3	3.6	7.4	3.5	8.0	4.3

* -- Note that some respondents reported more than one main occupation. The data here refer to the first occupation supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.34
Main Occupation by Party, West*

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	6.1	5.5	5.9	---	7.0	5.6	4.6
Public Service:							
-- Education and Science, Professional	21.2	7.5	11.8	---	10.2	13.9	1.5
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	19.7	18.5	17.6	---	22.3	13.9	60.0
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	1.5	1.0	0.0	---	3.7	2.8	3.1
-- Other, Not Specified	1.5	9.5	5.9	---	9.3	2.8	18.5
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	7.6	14.9	17.6	---	8.4	16.7	3.1
-- Professionals	19.7	6.5	14.7	---	4.7	5.6	3.1
-- Skilled Workers	4.5	19.4	5.9	---	12.1	25.0	3.1
-- Non-Skilled Workers	1.5	1.0	0.0	---	0.0	0.0	0.0
Not Employed	16.7	13.4	14.7	---	17.7	11.1	1.5
Unclear, No Answer	0.0	3.0	5.9	---	4.7	2.8	1.5

* -- Note that some respondents reported more than one main occupation. The data here refer to the first occupation supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.35
Main Occupation by Party, Council Members, East*

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	0.0	1.3	0.0	2.5	3.2	4.8	0.0
Public Service:							
-- Education and Science, Professional	13.6	7.8	0.0	20.0	9.6	4.8	11.1
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	9.1	13.0	16.7	5.0	10.6	9.5	11.1
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	4.5	5.2	0.0	1.3	6.4	0.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	6.4	0.0	0.0
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	22.7	20.8	33.3	5.0	22.3	14.3	11.1
-- Professionals	27.3	10.4	16.7	13.8	9.6	19.0	22.2
-- Skilled Workers	13.6	23.4	16.7	10.0	14.9	9.5	11.1
-- Non-Skilled Workers	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Not Employed	9.1	14.3	8.3	32.5	17.0	28.6	11.1
Unclear, No Answer	0.0	2.6	8.3	8.8	5.3	9.5	22.2

* -- Note that some respondents reported more than one main occupation. The data here refer to the first occupation supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.36
Main Occupation by Party, Council Members, West*

Occupational Category	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Representative, Executive in Government, Politician	5.1	5.9	0.0	—	2.6	0.0	0.0
Public Service:							
-- Education and Science, Professional	33.3	8.1	14.3	—	12.4	15.0	16.7
-- Traditional Public Service, Professional	5.1	7.4	19.0	—	14.4	10.0	16.7
-- Traditional Public Service, Non-Professional	0.0	1.5	0.0	—	4.6	0.0	0.0
-- Other, Not Specified	2.6	5.1	4.8	—	7.8	5.0	16.7
Private Sector:							
-- Self-Employed and Managers	7.7	17.6	14.3	—	11.1	20.0	16.7
-- Professionals	25.6	8.1	19.0	—	5.2	10.0	16.7
-- Skilled Workers	2.6	25.7	4.8	—	13.7	15.0	16.7
-- Non-Skilled Workers	2.6	1.5	0.0	—	0.0	0.0	0.0
Not Employed	15.4	16.2	19.0	—	23.5	15.0	0.0
Unclear, No Answer	0.0	2.9	4.8	—	4.6	5.0	0.0

* -- Note that some respondents reported more than one main occupation. The data here refer to the first occupation supplied by the respondents.

Table 3.37
Average Time (Number of Hours Per Week) Spent On
Carrying Out Main Official Job
By Office

	East	West
Council Members	11.2	12.7
Caucus Leaders	13.6	19.0
Party Leaders	12.7	14.1
Department Heads	48.0	45.8
Higher Office	58.0	47.8

Classification by office based on respondents' answer to open-ended question: "What is your most important political or administrative position?".

Table 3.38
Patterns of Associational Membership
By Office and Region

Note total membership is sum of number of types of organizations belonged to.

East		Total	Council	Caucus Leaders	Party Leaders	Department Heads	Higher Office
Total	Average	2.01	2.05	2.24	2.09	1.54	2.27
Percent Belonging to:							
Type	Occupational Associations	21.5	25.5	32.6	16.0	16.1	18.1
	Unions	30.6	37.6	33.7	38.7	17.2	16.0
	Educational Associations	12.5	11.3	9.8	12.0	8.6	20.2
	Cultural Associations	27.1	22.1	29.3	24.0	25.8	45.7
	Sport Associations	27.3	24.2	26.1	24.0	26.9	39.4
	Religious or Church Associations	27.3	25.8	22.8	21.3	30.1	34.0
	Environmental Associations	8.5	8.6	10.9	14.7	4.3	7.4
	Economic Associations	7.4	8.3	13.0	9.3	1.1	8.5
	Welfare Associations	25.6	26.4	28.3	32.0	15.1	29.8
	Other	13.8	16.6	17.4	17.3	8.6	7.3
	Any	89.0	89.6	90.2	92.0	83.9	90.4
West		Total	Council	Caucus Leaders	Party Leaders	Department Heads	Higher Office
Total	Average:	3.17	3.42	3.42	2.61	2.30	3.51
Percent Belonging to:							
Type	Occupation Associations	37.0	38.4	29.8	31.3	32.2	42.7
	Unions	32.4	35.9	38.1	31.3	24.3	28.2
	Educational Associations	25.5	27.7	29.8	32.5	12.2	31.5
	Cultural Associations	45.6	46.7	42.9	41.3	33.0	56.5
	Sport Associations	57.4	63.4	61.9	56.3	51.3	52.4
	Religious or Church Associations	39.4	39.4	39.3	41.3	33.0	50.0
	Environmental Associations	22.8	25.3	33.3	32.5	13.0	21.0
	Economic Associations	9.7	11.2	11.9	16.3	0.9	13.7
	Welfare Associations	38.3	42.8	40.5	33.8	26.1	47.6
	Other	8.5	9.9	14.3	8.8	4.3	7.4
	Any	96.0	96.9	95.2	96.3	93.0	98.4

Table 3.39
 Patterns of Associational Membership
 By Party ID and Region
 Note total membership is sum of number of types of organizations belonged to.

East		Entire Sample	Bündnis 90/Grünen	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Total	Average:	2.01	2.50	2.11	1.71	1.82	2.29	1.76	1.55
Percent									
Belonging to:									
Type									
	Occupational Associations	21.5	31.0	26.4	28.6	11.8	23.4	28.0	11.6
	Unions	30.6	28.6	18.6	7.1	58.1	41.8	8.0	14.5
	Educational Associations	12.5	14.3	11.6	10.7	10.8	16.3	8.0	10.1
	Cultural Associations	27.1	23.8	26.4	42.9	19.4	29.8	28.0	30.4
	Sport Associations	27.3	19.0	27.9	25.0	22.6	34.8	20.0	27.5
	Religious or Church Associations	27.3	38.1	51.2	14.3	2.2	22.0	32.0	27.5
	Environmental Associations	8.5	40.5	2.3	7.1	6.5	9.2	8.0	4.3
	Economic Associations	7.4	4.8	15.5	21.4	4.3	5.0	0.0	1.4
	Welfare Associations	25.6	38.1	17.8	7.1	23.7	38.3	28.0	13.0
	Other	13.8	11.9	13.2	7.1	22.6	8.5	16.0	14.5
	Any	89.0	92.9	91.5	82.1	90.3	89.5	80.0	86.4
West		Entire Sample	Bündnis 90/Grünen	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	Other	None
Total	Average	3.17	2.56	3.13	3.20		3.70	2.71	2.58
Percent									
Belonging to:									
Type									
	Occupational Associations	37.0	12.1	55.2	55.9		25.6	33.3	41.5
	Unions	32.4	42.4	12.4	5.9		62.8	16.7	9.2
	Educational Associations	25.5	18.2	24.9	38.2		30.7	22.2	15.4
	Cultural Associations	45.6	24.2	44.3	52.9		54.9	44.4	43.1
	Sport Associations	57.4	28.8	59.2	67.6		60.9	72.2	60.0
	Religious or Church Associations	39.4	28.8	51.2	29.4		34.9	30.6	43.1
	Environmental Associations	22.8	56.1	10.4	14.7		28.8	13.9	18.5
	Economic Associations	9.7	4.5	17.4	17.6		3.7	16.7	1.5
	Welfare Associations	38.3	27.3	29.9	35.3		59.1	33.3	16.9
	Other	8.5	13.6	8.0	2.9		8.8	5.6	9.2
	Any	96.0	95.5	98.5	97.1		96.8	91.7	91.5

Table 3.40
 Reliance By Political or Administrative Function
 Percent indicating they rely upon specific groups or individuals
 in their political and administrative functions when making decisions

East

Category	Individual/Group	CM*	CL	PL	DH	HO
1	Local Party Politicians	62	58	57	35	56
	Party Politicians, Higher Level	49	55	69	23	50
	Groups in Local Party Organization	34	36	45	9	21
2	Member of City Council	53	58	60	48	68
	Mayor/Chief Mayor	53	58	47	86	63
3	Leading City Administrators	56	55	41	73	50
	Administrative Colleagues	13	10	12	75	59
	Higher Administrative Officials	12	15	15	51	24
4	Local Reps. Political Movements	33	33	31	10	21
	Local Civic & Occup. Groups involved in City Politics	40	46	44	10	34
5	Reg. Econ. Groups, Chambers ...	28	38	31	22	36
	Unions	24	29	28	9	7
6	Public	49	52	52	16	41
	Local Ethnic Groups	3	2	0	1	2
	Local Church Groups	11	5	12	4	9
	Neighborhood Groups	7	9	5	2	1
	Poorer People	16	11	17	2	5
Wealthy People	2	0	4	1	2	
7	Local Newspapers	28	26	44	15	21
8	Colleagues, Neighboring Cities	11	12	17	35	22
	** Colleagues, WG Partner-Cities	23	29	32	63	48
9	Close Friends & Sympathizers	61	64	63	16	32

West

Category	Individual/Group	CM	CL	PL	DH	HO
1	Local Party Politicians	73	71	80	21	61
	Party Politicians, Higher Level	64	64	70	13	58
	Groups in Local Party Organization	40	37	44	9	28
2	Member of City Council	47	57	45	48	54
	Mayor/Chief Mayor	60	56	52	74	60
3	Leading City Administrators	66	64	60	80	69
	Administrative Colleagues	14	8	16	82	40
	Higher Administrative Officials	22	27	16	46	31
4	Local Reps. Political Movements	29	33	31	15	23
	Local Civic & Occup. Groups involved in City Politics	40	48	46	16	35
5	Reg. Econ. Groups, Chambers ...	30	35	27	23	44
	Unions	26	26	15	16	11
6	Public	50	56	56	19	44
	Local Ethnic Groups	7	10	6	2	1
	Local Church Groups	16	18	12	10	15
	Neighborhood Groups	9	12	10	5	6
	Poorer People	10	12	10	2	4
Wealthy People	5	6	6	1	2	
7	Local Newspapers	42	51	54	21	34
8	Colleagues, Neighboring Cities	21	27	23	46	31
	** Colleagues, WG Partner-Cities	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
9	Close Friends & Sympathizers	55	51	52	22	44

* Key: CM - Council Member; CL - Caucus Leader; PL - Party Leader; DH - Department Head; HO - Higher Office
 ** asked only in new federal states

Table 3.41
 Reliance by Party Affiliation or Leaning across the Regions
 Percent indicating they rely upon specific groups or individuals
 in their political and administrative functions when making decisions

East

Category	Individual/Group	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	None	Other
1	Local Party Politicians	55	58	50	67	65	33	28
	Party Politicians, Higher Level	45	48	46	60	55	23	20
	Groups in Local Party Organization	21	29	21	57	35	4	4
2	Member of City Council	52	56	54	66	57	49	52
	Mayor/Chief Mayor	50	65	75	40	60	78	40
3	Leading City Administrators	50	60	43	46	59	68	52
	Administrative Colleagues	21	33	39	6	30	67	20
	Higher Administrative Officials	14	23	25	6	17	48	16
4	Local Reps. Political Movements	40	22	29	46	25	12	12
	Local Civic & Occup. Groups involved in City Politics	67	25	14	58	29	19	48
5	Reg. Econ. Groups, Chambers ...	21	33	29	24	28	25	40
	Unions	21	7	0	38	29	7	4
6	Public	55	36	29	67	44	20	48
	Local Ethnic Groups	0	3	0	2	3	1	4
	Local Church Groups	19	19	0	2	5	4	16
	Neighborhood Groups	2	5	0	12	1	4	4
	Poorer People	12	6	4	25	11	4	12
Wealthy People	0	2	0	3	3	3	0	
7	Local Newspapers	57	21	18	39	19	14	48
8	Colleagues, Neighboring Cities	17	16	18	9	18	32	12
	* Colleagues, WG Partner-Cities	26	43	36	6	41	58	20
9	Close Friends & Sympathizers	64	43	36	75	51	19	64

West

Category	Individual/Group	B90/G	Union	FDP	PDS	SPD	None	Other
1	Local Party Politicians	67	68	79		65	18	61
	Party Politicians, Higher Level	47	63	56		62	15	28
	Groups in Local Party Organization	36	32	24		42	2	19
2	Member of City Council	47	42	50		56	43	53
	Mayor/Chief Mayor	41	63	74		59	80	61
3	Leading City Administrators	61	71	56		67	80	61
	Administrative Colleagues	24	24	26		28	78	25
	Higher Administrative Officials	26	27	9		27	48	14
4	Local Reps. Political Movements	52	18	12		27	14	36
	Local Civic & Occup. Groups involved in City Politics	80	24	21		39	15	53
5	Reg. Econ. Groups, Chambers ...	11	36	53		25	22	47
	Unions	24	9	6		39	9	6
6	Public	58	37	44		44	34	69
	Local Ethnic Groups	14	1	3		7	2	6
	Local Church Groups	20	18	12		10	11	14
	Neighborhood Groups	12	5	3		9	8	14
	Poorer People	17	2	6		10	5	3
Wealthy People	6	3	3		5	3	0	
7	Local Newspapers	67	30	50		37	26	47
8	Colleagues, Neighboring Cities	33	26	26		20	49	28
	* Colleagues, WG Partner-Cities	NA	NA	NA		NA	NA	NA
9	Close Friends & Sympathizers	70	41	56		50	26	44

* asked only in new federal states

Table 3.42
Evaluations of Top-Level Administrators Operating
in Intermediate Zone of Politics and Administration:
By Office

	East:			West:		
	Very Bad or Bad	Mixed	Good or Very Good	Very Bad or Bad	Mixed	Good or Very Good
Entire Sample	20.6	54.4	25.0	20.4	51.2	28.4
Council Members	20.7	58.8	20.4	23.7	49.6	26.6
Caucus Leaders	29.7	52.7	17.6	21.7	54.2	24.1
Party Leaders	29.3	49.3	21.3	23.8	63.8	12.5
Department Heads	16.5	50.5	33.0	12.3	53.5	34.2
Higher Office	16.0	44.7	39.4	17.1	49.6	33.3

Table 3.43
Evaluations of Top-Level Administrators Operating
in Intermediate Zone of Politics and Administration:
By Party

	East:			West:		
	Very Bad or Bad	Mixed	Good or Very Good	Very Bad or Bad	Mixed	Good or Very Good
Bündnis 90/Grünen	40.5	47.6	11.9	27.3	56.1	16.7
Union	17.1	54.3	28.7	20.4	46.3	33.3
FDP	25.9	40.7	33.3	14.7	61.8	23.5
PDS	30.1	57.0	12.9	NA	NA	NA
SPD	12.9	56.4	30.7	17.0	52.4	30.7
Other	36.0	32.0	32.0	33.3	47.2	19.4
None	14.7	60.3	25.0	18.8	53.1	28.1

Table 3.44
Role Identification by Office

		Technician	Advocate	Facilitator	Broker	Implementor	Partisan Politician	Trustee	Legalist	Ombudsman	Initiator
Council Member	East	3.15	3.86	2.81	3.00	2.78	2.88	3.01	2.26	3.59	3.40
	West	3.17	3.72	2.38	3.16	2.99	2.92	3.17	2.10	3.86	3.84
Caucus Leader	East	3.28	3.94	3.11	3.10	2.97	3.02	3.12	2.22	3.67	3.57
	West	3.26	3.68	2.40	3.17	2.94	2.90	3.13	2.37	3.73	4.04
Party Leader	East	3.45	3.87	2.90	3.14	2.88	3.31	2.91	2.18	3.49	3.67
	West	3.12	3.65	2.38	3.08	2.92	3.14	2.76	2.15	3.81	3.98
Department Heads	East	3.87	2.71	2.10	3.03	3.40	1.52	3.43	3.10	2.67	3.58
	West	4.16	2.88	1.85	3.52	3.63	1.34	2.96	3.29	2.81	3.70
Higher Office	East	3.63	3.61	2.49	3.59	3.44	2.21	3.90	2.66	4.41	4.08
	West	3.62	3.81	2.22	3.63	3.29	2.19	4.25	2.45	3.71	4.12

Role Variables Scoring: 1 to 5 with 1 = low identification and 5 = high identification.

Table 3.45
Role Identification by Party (Council Members Only)

		Technician	Advocate	Facilitator	Broker	Implementor	Partisan Politician	Trustee	Legalist	Ombudsman	Initiator
B90/G	East	2.77	3.91	3.00	2.77	2.41	2.54	2.46	2.09	3.73	3.22
	West	3.00	3.56	2.61	2.49	2.34	3.03	2.10	1.70	3.69	4.08
Union	East	3.05	3.56	2.71	3.11	3.00	3.18	3.46	2.57	3.44	3.38
	West	3.23	3.75	2.29	3.30	3.09	2.97	3.37	2.17	3.76	3.74
FDP	East	4.08	3.83	2.27	3.54	2.27	2.46	3.17	1.91	3.36	3.17
	West	2.62	3.38	2.24	3.43	2.95	3.19	3.43	2.43	3.81	3.95
PDS	East	3.13	4.05	3.07	2.64	2.51	2.68	2.46	2.16	3.64	3.26
	West	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
SPD	East	3.15	4.02	2.62	3.14	3.01	3.22	3.10	2.09	3.60	3.52
	West	3.20	3.80	2.46	3.21	3.23	3.04	3.18	2.02	3.99	3.78
Other	East	3.60	3.67	3.35	2.76	2.71	2.38	2.95	2.30	4.14	3.81
	West	3.50	3.45	2.65	3.25	2.30	1.60	3.55	2.45	3.85	4.50
None	East	3.11	3.89	3.22	3.89	2.11	1.11	3.50	2.78	3.44	3.56
	West	3.40	3.60	1.40	3.40	1.80	1.00	3.83	2.40	4.33	4.17

Table 3.46
Principal Components Analysis of Role Orientations
(Based on Orthogonal Rotation)

Factors:	I	II	III
Variables:			
Techician	.68	-.12	-.09
Legalist	.67	-.20	.11
Broker	.55	.37	.01
Trustee	.50	.17	.43
Advocate	-.16	.74	.05
Ombudsman	.04	.72	-.06
Initiator	.47	.50	-.06
Facilitator	-.03	.47	.31
Implementor	.29	-.09	.76
Partisan Politician	-.36	.16	.73
<hr/>			
Variance Explained:	20.9	17.5	12.8
Eigenvalues:	2.09	1.75	1.28

Table 3.47: Administrative Role Orientation as a Function of Political-Administrative Position, Party Affiliation, and Other Characteristics

	b (t-stat.)
Position:	
Higher Office	.502 (4.28)**
Administrator	.728 (5.21)**
Party Leader	-.076 (-0.77)
Caucus Leader	.198 (2.50)**
Council Member	-.222 (-1.97)**
Party Affiliation:	
Bündnis 90/Grünen	-.532 (-4.32)**
Union	-.031 (-0.32)
FDP	-.272 (-1.88)**
PDS	-.490 (-3.66)**
Rep.	-.788 (-2.33)**
SPD	-.294 (-3.09)**
Other	.094 (0.64)
Other Characteristics:	
Class Background--Higher	-.134 (-1.73)*
Class Background--Lower	-.024 (0.74)
Training--University, Admin.	.547 (3.77)**
Training--University, Tech.	.420 (3.01)**
Training--University, Social	.164 (1.15)
Training--Non-Univ., Admin.	.186 (1.33)
Training--Non-Univ., Tech.	.259 (1.92)**
Training--Non-Univ., Social	.397 (1.62)

continued on next page

Region (1=West/2=East)	-.063 (-0.96)
Age	.006 (2.26)**
Gender (1=Male/2=Female)	-.251 (-3.38)**
Organizational Ties	.040 (2.33)**
Constant	-1.36 (-0.50)

Summary Statistics:

\bar{R}^2	.293
F	18.2
(Sig. F)	(<.01)
number of cases	994

** - sig. at .05 level

* - sig. at .10 level

Table 3.48: Non-Partisan Political Role Orientation as a Function of Political-Administrative Position, Party Affiliation, and Other Characteristics

	b (t-stat.)
Position:	
Higher Office	-.003 (-0.02)
Administrator	-.909 (-6.20)**
Party Leader	-.012 (-0.12)
Caucus Leader	.100 (1.16)
Council Member	-.086 (-0.73)
Party Affiliation:	
Bündnis 90/Grünen	.204 (1.58)
Union	.106 (1.03)
FDP	.076 (0.50)
PDS	.225 (1.60)
Rep.	.007 (0.02)
SPD	.185 (1.85)*
Other	.377 (2.33)**
Other Characteristics:	
Class Background--Higher	.089 (1.10)
Class Background--Lower	.054 (1.60)
Training--University, Admin.	.036 (0.24)
Training--University, Tech.	.180 (1.23)
Training--University, Social	.306 (2.05)**
Training--Non-Univ., Admin.	.153 (1.04)
Training--Non-Univ., Tech.	.191 (1.35)
Training--Non-Univ., Social	.439* (1.71)

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Region (1=West/2=East)	-.003 (-0.05)
Age	.005 (1.65)*
Gender (1=Male/2=Female)	.066 (0.85)
Organizational Ties	.085 (4.64)**
Constant	-.698 (-2.47)**

Summary Statistics:

\bar{R}^2	.225
F	11.7
(Sig. F)	(<.01)
number of cases	994

** - sig. at .05 level

* - sig. at .10 level

Table 3.49 Partisan Political Role Orientation (Based Solely on Response to Partisan Politician Item) as a Function of Political-Administrative Position, Party Affiliation, and Other Characteristics

	b (t-stat.)
Position:	
Higher Office	-.350 (-2.08)**
Administrator	-.890 (-4.48)**
Party Leader	.714 (5.04)**
Caucus Leader	.124 (1.10)
Council Member	.335 (2.07)**
Party Affiliation:	
Bündnis 90/Grünen	.384 (2.17)**
Union	.468 (3.37)**
FDP	.384 (1.88)*
PDS	.290 (1.52)
Rep.	-.545 (-1.11)
SPD	.662 (4.48)**
Other	-.485 (-2.32)**
Other Characteristics:	
Class Background--Higher	-.092 (-0.85)
Class Background--Lower	-.042 (-0.98)
Training--University, Admin.	-.539 (-2.56)**
Training--University, Tech.	-.663 (-3.28)**
Training--University, Social	-.561 (-2.72)**
Training--Non-Univ., Admin.	-.474 (-2.32)**
Training--Non-Univ., Tech.	-.506 (-2.58)**
Training--Non-Univ., Social	-.746 (-2.08)**

continued on next page

Region (1=West/2=East)	.102 (1.10)
Age	.000 (0.06)
Gender (1=Male/2=Female)	.099 (0.95)
Organizational Ties	-.021 (-0.86)
Constant	2.43 (6.63)**

Summary Statistics:

\bar{R}^2	.249
F	13.9
(Sig. F)	(<.01)
number of cases	1036

** - sig. at .05 level

* - sig. at .10 level