Double Standards of Recruitment for Men and Women?
Evidence from Moonlighting of German Parliamentarians

Benny Geys* and Karsten Mause*

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Abstract
Public and scholarly debate on politicians’ extra-parliamentary activities often concentrates on whether such ‘moonlighting’ engenders neglect of parliamentary duties and/or signals financial greed. Building on extensive research on gender effects in recruitment processes, this paper takes a different perspective and analyses how politicians’ gender affects their probability of having outside activities. Using a novel dataset of moonlighting by 614 German MPs over the period 10/2005-09/2007), our analysis confirms theoretical predictions that, even when analysing a recruitment pool of higher-than-average ability working in a strongly politicised environment, gender matters in recruitment processes.

Keywords: Moonlighting, Recruitment, Gender, Glass Ceiling, Stereotypes.

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* Norwegian School of Management (BI), Nydalsveien 37, N-0442 Oslo, Norway; and Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin (Germany), Email: geys@wzb.eu. (corresponding author)

* University of Bremen, Research Center “Transformations of the State” (SFB 597), P.O.Box 330440, D-28334 Bremen (Germany), Email: mause@uni-bremen.de.
1. Introduction

Elected representatives in most countries are legally permitted to carry out jobs in addition to their political mandate. Such ‘moonlighting’ activities attract significant public and political debate as well as scientific inquiry (for a review, see Geys and Mause 2010). These discussions mostly examine whether moonlighting indicates financial greed, impinges on politicians’ time for political activities (e.g., Becker et al. 2009), leads to conflicts of interest (e.g., Rosenson 2007) or, in a more positive view, improves the quality of parliamentarians by generating additional experience and qualifications (e.g., Gagliarducci et al. 2008).

Studies addressing variation in moonlighting across politicians are much less common (for exceptions, see Parker 1992; Mause 2009). Yet, some members of parliament (MPs) have more than 20 such jobs, while others have none. Likewise, some MPs hold outside jobs in the private sector of the economy, others only (or also) in the public sector (e.g., in regulatory agencies or foundations). This paper applies insights from a large social science literature addressing the development of women into positions of leadership to address whether, and how, politicians’ gender influences the extent of their moonlighting behaviour. It thereby complements research documenting the effects of gender on private-sector hiring and promotion decisions (for a review, see Reskin and Bielby 2005) and on purely political careers (both regarding individuals’ electoral choice and intra-party candidate selection; e.g., Rosenwasser and Seale 1988; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Rahat 2007; Galligan and Clavero, 2008; Esteve-Volart and Bagues 2009).

One can wonder whether gender is an “important aspect to consider when studying individuals at the very top of society’s hierarchy” since these individuals “have already eliminated potential distractions” from gender effects (Hansson 2010: 3). Yet, whether this is really the case has not been previously tested. Our empirical results, using data covering 614 German MPs in the period 10/2005-09/2007 (32.1% of which are female), do not confirm the above intuition. In fact, they show considerable support for the influence of gender on moonlighting activities. For example, political experience appears irrelevant for men in
obtaining ancillary positions in the private sector, but has a significant positive impact for women. Also, while children are associated with a higher number of sideline jobs (possibly due to higher spending and, thus, income requirements associated with family expansion), this ‘child effect’ holds particularly for male MPs while it is statistically insignificant for female ones. Overall, even when analysing a recruitment pool of higher-than-average ability working in a strongly politicised environment, gender retains a manifest influence on recruitment decisions.

It is important to stress that, although our analysis uncovers clear and strong gender-effects in politicians’ moonlighting activities, this need not reflect gender discrimination or employers’ pro-male bias. While this is one possible interpretation, another is that women are less likely than men to seek and/or accept offers of sideline activities (especially in the private sector). The ‘double standards’ in the title thus need not imply employers’ discrimination, but could also refer to different standards male and female MPs set themselves regarding outside employment. We return to this more extensively below.

The next section contains our theoretical argumentation and hypotheses. Then, Section 3 introduces the dataset employed, and Section 4 describes our empirical strategy and results. Finally, Section 5 reviews our main findings, and suggests avenues for further research.

2. Theoretical Background

From a theoretical perspective, politicians’ observed moonlighting behaviour can be interpreted as the equilibrium outcome of a recruitment market. On one side of this market, there are firms or organisations seeking ‘employees’ that best match their desired profile and performance expectations. Assuming a candidate with a political background is considered, they map their preferences onto the pool of available politicians and make an offer to one or more politicians closest to their desired profile. Then, on the other side of the market, there are politicians being offered sideline positions and deciding whether or not to accept such offers. However, as politicians are not necessarily passive agents in this market, they may also actively
apply or put themselves forward for consideration by sending appropriate signals. In either case, their decisions will be guided by constraints from their personal situation (e.g., family, income), professional circumstances (e.g., potential for conflicts of interest), and the characteristics of the available or offered jobs (e.g., remuneration, intellectual challenge, time-investment, future career possibilities).

Bringing both sides together, it is clear that analysing moonlighting behaviour across politicians requires accounting for what makes politicians a) of interest to those offering outside jobs and b) likely to seek out and/or accept/reject such positions.1 Building on a large social science literature addressing the development of women into positions of leadership (for a review, see Reskin and Bielby 2005), this paper specifically analyses the role of gender on the outcome of such recruitment process.

A central reason why gender can be expected to affect recruitment decisions is that it functions as one of the primary means of categorizing individuals in Western societies (Brewer and Lui 1989; Ridgeway 1997, 2009). When we engage in interpersonal interactions—e.g., during recruitment procedures—we “automatically and unconsciously sex-categorize any other to whom we must relate” (Ridgeway 1997: 220; Brewer and Lui 1989). Such sex categorization has important consequences for how we behave towards each other, because it easily triggers gender stereotypes (Deaux and Major 1987; Bargh 1989), which “denote not only differences in how women and men actually are [descriptive], but also norms about behaviours that are suitable for each [prescriptive]” (Heilman 2001: 659; Burgess and Borgida 1999).

Inherent in such (gender) stereotypes are status beliefs, that is, “widely held cultural beliefs that link greater social significance and general competence (…) to one category of social distinction [e.g., race, gender, age, and so on] compared to another” (Ridgeway 2001: 638). According to expectation-states theory (Berger et al. 1977), such status beliefs help shape expectations concerning the performance and ability of individuals—and thus can play a critical role in recruitment processes. Crucially, with respect to gender, status beliefs are well
documented to associate “greater status worthiness and competence with men than women” (Ridgeway 2001: 637; Broverman et al. 1972). The implied gender hierarchy prescribed by gender status beliefs gives rise to expectations that women *ceteris paribus* are likely to underperform men (for a review, see Bowen et al. 2000) and are ‘lucky’ rather than ‘able’ to have reached performance of a given quality (for a review, see Swim and Sanna 1996). Consequently, a ‘lack of fit’ is perceived between women’s characteristics and the requirements for success in particular jobs (Heilman 1983; 1995) and “a preference for male workers” is generated (Ridgeway 1997: 228).

Moreover, as these status beliefs and resulting expectations have important self-fulfilling effects (Harris and Rosenthal 1985; Miller and Turnbull 1986), they not only affect recruiters, but also female applicants. In fact, it undermines the latter’s “assertiveness and confidence, (…) their actual performance and their influence in the situation” (Ridgeway 1997: 222). As such, women may not only be less likely to be offered certain positions, but may at the same time perceive themselves as less appropriate—and thus be less likely to seek them out or accept them when offered. Hence, our first hypothesis is:

**H1a:** Women are, compared to men, less likely to have many sideline jobs.

The depicted effects have been shown to hold more strongly for male gender-typed jobs (such as private-sector management positions); see, e.g., Schein (1973, 2001), Heilman et al. (1989) and Watts (2009) on the perceived incompatibility between women’s abilities and leadership requirements. Indeed, for such positions, the “very essence of gender stereotypes defines men as more instrumentally competent and agentic compared to women” (Biernat and Fuegen 2001: 707; Broverman et al. 1972), leading to a larger perceived lack of fit between female characteristics and characteristics required for success in such jobs. It is important to mention here that the German private sector is still intensely male-dominated. This is important for two reasons. First, it implies that ‘old-boy networks’—which often have important effects on
hiring processes and outcomes (e.g., Saloner 1985; McDonald et al. 2009)—may constitute a barrier for women. Second, Kanter (1976) argues that a ‘critical mass’ of women is “crucial for women to reach acceptance and to ‘fit in’ at work” (Hansson 2010: 5). Male domination in the private sector may thus lead to stronger perceptions that women ‘lack fit’. These points further specify the hypothesis formulated above in the following way:

**H1b:** The relation described under H1a is most pronounced for private-sector functions.

By predefining the way we regard candidates for a given position, gender stereotypes lead women to start off with a disadvantage. To overcome this, it is “in women’s interest to introduce additional job-relevant information that undermines [gender status beliefs’] effects on perceptions of the competence” of women (Ridgeway 1997: 227). Often, this implies that they have to show “greater evidence of competence” in order to be recruited or promoted (Lyness and Heilman 2006: 779). This is closely related to the theory about double standards for competence derived from expectation states theory (Foschi and Foddy 1988; Foschi 2000), which argues that “performance by members of lower status groups (e.g., women) [is] assessed by stricter standards than similar performance by members of higher status groups (e.g., men)” (Lyness and Heilman 2006: 779). Experimental analyses of this theory have indeed shown that women are held—by both male and female judges—to higher confirmatory standards (i.e. standards indicating a candidate has the ability to perform a given task); they thus require a higher skill level to convince judges they have the ability to perform the job (e.g., Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Biernat and Fuegen 2001). Such gendered difference in standards for diagnosing competence implies that women have to work harder to achieve promotions, jobs, or levels of authority (see Kramer and Lambert 2001; Lyness and Heilman 2006; Gorman and Kmec 2007).

This line of argument suggests that evidence of individual abilities is likely to be more important for women than men to prove their value—both to outside employers and to themselves (in order to overcome the self-fulfilling effects of status beliefs mentioned above). In
the setting under investigation, such evidence can most directly derive from educational attainment and relevant professional experience (i.e. more terms in office). This leads to our second hypothesis.

**H2:** *University education and political experience are more important for women than men in obtaining sideline activities.*

Gender stereotypes not only contain beliefs about the overall status of men versus women (see above), but also grant each gender particular skills (Ridgeway 2001). For example, mechanical ability and leadership skills are often associated with men, while domestic skills tend to be reserved for women (Broverman et al. 1972; Schein 1973; Heilman et al. 1989). This not only affects women’s perceived aptitude at ‘male’-designated tasks, but also creates expectations that women are more likely to take care of family and children. Moreover, family is perceived to be a “greater priority for women than career advancement” (Kramer and Lambert 2001: 113; Nieva and Gutek 1981). This family-orientation is “often viewed by promotional decision makers as lacking loyalty and commitment” (Kramer and Lambert 2001: 113; Collinson 1998), and thereby reduces the promotion potential of women (Kramer and Lambert 2001; Granqvist and Persson 2005). While the above-mentioned effects are based on perceptions, motherhood itself has recently also been shown to carry a penalty in terms of recruitment and wages (see Budig and England 2001; Cuddy et al. 2004; Correll et al. 2007). Interestingly, the reverse might hold for men as men with children are often perceived as “more serious” and in possession of “mature leadership qualities” compared to their single or childless counterparts. This makes them more likely candidates for promotion (Coltrane 2004: 215; Correll et al. 2007).

Both elements suggest that parental status may have different effects for the ability of male and female politicians to attract outside jobs. It might also affect whether outside jobs are actively pursued and how obtained offers are evaluated once the family expands. Indeed, “gendered expectations about home-making and breadwinning” (Coltrane 2004: 214) may leave
politician-mothers more reluctant than politician-fathers to take up outside jobs. Still, at this demand-side of the recruitment market the number of children (rather than mere parenthood) may also play a role. An increasing number of children induces the need to generate more income to support the family and its lifestyle, and thus increases demand for and/or acceptance of ancillary activities—for men and women alike. Given the high income-elasticity of demand for quality of children (e.g., Becker and Tomes 1976), this effect is likely to occur even when politicians’ inside income is high. This discussion yields our third hypothesis.

**H3:** Parenthood constrains sideline activities of female politicians, but may increase men’s. The number of children enhances outside activities across genders.

Finally, while numerous studies illustrate employers’ negative stereotypical attitudes towards older employees (e.g., Taylor and Walker 1994; Porcellato et al. 2010), little research to date has regarded how gender interacts with such ‘ageism’ (Duncan and Loretto 2004). Nonetheless, physical signs of aging have long been argued to represent a stronger disadvantage for women compared to men (e.g., Ward 1977; Sontag 1979). Such a “double standard of aging” (Sontag 1979: 462) or “gendered ageism” (Itzin and Phillipson 1995) obtains significant empirical support. For example, women are perceived as losing physical attractiveness to a faster and greater extent than men as they age (e.g., Berman et al. 1981; Deutsch et al. 1986), which is important since physically less attractive individuals are disadvantaged in the job market (e.g., Morrow et al. 1990; Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). Moreover, in movies, often viewed as “reflections of a culture’s attitudes, beliefs and standards” (Bazzini et al. 1997: 532), there is a “tendency to negatively portray aging women as compared to aging men”, in terms of physical attractiveness, intelligence, friendliness and goodness (Bazzini et al. 1997: 540). This closely relates to experimental evidence showing that older men score higher than older women when judged by experimental subjects on “intellectual competence” and “autonomy” (Canetto et al. 1995), placing older women at a clear comparative disadvantage in the job market.
Managers/employers are not immune to this stereotype, since research shows that they perceive women to ‘reach their peak’ at a younger age than men (Itzin and Phillipson 1995).

These arguments imply possibly significant negative effects of being older and being female on occupational outcomes. Recent empirical evidence using a sample of 318 movie stars over the period 1926-1999 supports this proposition by showing that older female actors are “disadvantaged both in terms of number of film roles and in terms of average star presence [i.e. importance in the movie as judged by ones rank in the film’s credits], compared to older male actors” (Lincoln and Allen 2004: 623). While physical appearance may be particularly important for actors, similar effects could occur in “elite professions that require a public presentation of self, such as (...) public officials” (Lincoln and Allen 2004: 613). Hence, female politicians may have a lower likelihood than male politicians of being offered outside jobs with increasing age. Moreover, as “women’s internalization of societal and institutional ageism has helped to perpetuate their marginality” (Bronstein 2001: 184), women may also become less likely than men to put themselves forward for consideration and/or accept such offers with increasing age. This leads to our fourth and final hypothesis.

**H4:** Age is more disadvantageous to female than male politicians in obtaining sideline activities.

3. Institutional Background and Data

Members of the German national parliament (Bundestag) are, subject to public disclosure rules, legally allowed to moonlight. They are obliged to report all professional activities pursued in addition to their political mandate that fall into the following categories:

1. “paid activities in addition to the mandate” (e.g., self-employed lawyer or management consultant);
2. “activities as a member of the management, supervisory, administrative, advisory or other board in a private enterprise”;

...
(3) similar activities “in local authorities [e.g., in city/county council] or public corporations”
    (e.g., in public broadcasting company or regulatory agency);
(4) “activities as a member of the managing or advisory board in clubs, associations and
    foundations which are not solely of local significance”;
(5) “agreements on future activities or pecuniary advantages”;
(6) “investments in business companies” (if MP has a voting share of more than 25%).vi

Declared sideline activities were published for the first time on 17 September 2007 in the
Official Handbook of the German Bundestag (Bundestag 2007), and have been continuously
updated on the Bundestag website since then. Below, we employ the print version of the data
since these had a uniform due date for all parliamentarians. This provides us with information on
the moonlighting activities of all 614 members of the German Bundestag in the period 10/2005
to 09/2007 (197 female and 417 male members).

The number of ancillary activities for each MP is counted as the sum of activities in
categories (1) through (4) and (6).vii To address the variety in ancillary activities and empirically
test H1b, we separate activities in the private sector of the economy from those in the public
sector. The former is measured by the sum of ancillary activities in categories (2) and (6), and
adding activities from category (1) when the data indicate that the activity is not performed for
organizations in the political system (e.g., party leader, state secretary, federal minister, and so
on). Sideline activities in the public sector are measured as the sum of ancillary activities in
categories (3) and (4), and adding activities from category (1) when the data indicate that the
function is performed for an organization in the political system.

-- Figure 1 about here --
Figure 1 presents the data. The number of MPs is given on the vertical axis, the number of sideline jobs on the horizontal axis. The distribution for the overall number of sideline jobs is represented by the black cubes, while the distributions for sideline jobs in the private and public sector are given by the dotted and striped cubes, respectively. Figure 1 reveals that 12.1% of the 614 members of the German Bundestag (= 74 MPs) have no sideline activities requiring publication, while a few parliamentarians exhibit a large number of ancillary activities (up to a maximum of 24 activities). Sideline jobs are more common in the public sector. Indeed, 304 MPs report to have no ancillary activities in the private sector, whereas only 117 MPs report the same about secondary activities in the public sector. The maximum number of sideline jobs is also higher in the public sector (24) than in the private sector (14).

4. Empirical Analysis

4.1 Regression Model and Methodology

To empirically test our four hypotheses, we estimate a regression model of the following form (with subscript \(i\) referring to MPs):

\[
Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 GENDER_i + \sum_{k=3}^{6} \beta_j (GENDER_i * Z_i) + \epsilon_i ,
\]

where \(Y_i\) represents a vector of three dependent variables: namely, total number of ancillary activities, ancillary activities in the private sector and ancillary activities in the public sector (as depicted in Figure 1). \(X_i\) is a set of control variables describing the characteristics of MP\(_i\)’s political mandate (party affiliation, party-list mandate vs. direct mandate, home federal state, number of legislative periods attended), whether or not MP\(_i\) holds an important political office (i.e. minister, secretary of state, leader of his/her parliamentary fraction, committee leadership or (vice-)president of the Bundestag), and his/her socio-demographic characteristics (age, marital status, number of children, educational background, religious affiliation, occupational background). The central variable of interest is \(GENDER_i\), an indicator variable equal to 1 for
female MPs, 0 for males. This allows testing whether women—compared to men—have fewer sideline jobs, especially in the private sector (i.e. $\beta_2<0$; see H1a and H1b). Then, to test H2, H3 and H4, we introduce interaction terms between this gender-variable and a set of four background characteristics (contained in $Z_i$, a subset of $X_i$): number of legislative periods attended, age, number of children and an educational-background dummy (1=MP obtained university degree, 0=otherwise).ix The interaction terms evaluate whether, and how, parliamentary experience, age, children and higher education play a different role for men and women. As we have clear directional hypotheses concerning these interaction effects, we evaluate them using one-tailed significance tests (Thomas 1997). Summary statistics for our central variables are provided in Table A1 in Appendix A, separated by gender.

Regarding the choice of the appropriate estimation technique, it has to be taken into account that our dependent variables only take non-negative integer values, and have a highly skewed distribution. This invalidates the use of standard linear regression techniques (i.e. OLS). Moreover, tests for overdispersion indicate that the dependent variables’ variance is significantly higher than their mean ($p<0.01$ in all cases), implying that the Poisson distribution is likewise inappropriate. Hence, a negative binomial count model is employed to estimate equation (1).

4.2 Results

Table 1 displays our results. Columns (1) through (3) contain results for the pure gender effect, while Columns (4) through (6) also include the interaction effects between MPs’ gender and background characteristics. In both cases, we report results for the total number of outside jobs (Columns (1) and (4)), the amount of private-sector jobs (Columns (2) and (5)), and the number of public-sector jobs (Columns (3) and (6)).

-- Table 1 about here --
Column (1) of Table 1 confirms that, *ceteris paribus*, women on average hold less sideline jobs than men. As shown in Columns (2) and (3), this effect is completely due to their lower number of sideline jobs in the private sector. That is, while gender has a strong and statistically significant negative relation to the number of MPs’ sideline activities in the private sector, its relation with the number of ancillary positions in the public sector remains insignificant. Although our data, unfortunately, do not allow to disentangle whether this derives from women being more/less likely to be offered certain positions (e.g., because organizations under public law have to comply with higher gender-equality standards than private-sector companies) or being more likely to reject them when offered (we return to this important interpretation issue in the conclusion), the depicted results are in agreement with H1a and H1b.

There is also support for H2. Indeed, Columns (4) through (6) illustrate that a university degree has a negative association with the number of sideline activities for men, both in the public and private sector. While initially surprising, one potential explanation is that higher-educated parliamentarians are more likely to have obtained sufficient wealth and/or social networks when entering parliament, reducing their need to accept—possibly numerous—outside jobs as an insurance mechanism against the uncertainty of parliamentary life. Crucially, however, the interaction term between university education and the gender dummy (indicating the effect of higher education when the gender-dummy becomes 1 = female) is consistently positively signed in line with our theoretical predictions. Moreover, it is statistically significant at conventional levels when analysing MPs’ overall and private-sector sideline activities.

Related, we find that the number of parliamentary terms—our proxy for political experience—has an overall positive effect for men (though this effect is only statistically significant for public-sector sideline jobs). The interaction term with the gender dummy (1 = female) is once again consistently positively signed, and statistically significant for overall ancillary positions and private-sector jobs. This further supports H2.
Note that the findings for parliamentary experience cannot simply be explained by the higher average age of such parliamentarians. In fact, and supportive of H4, age is unrelated to the overall number of outside jobs for men, but has a significant negative effect for women. Interestingly, for private-sector sideline jobs, age has a statistically significant positive effect for men (0.025; p<0.01), but a negative (though insignificant) effect for women (i.e. 0.025−0.031= -0.006; Chi²=0.14; p=0.70). Overall, these findings suggest that while age might well be an asset for men, it tends to be a burden (or, at least, is a significantly less valuable asset) for women. This is corroborative of a “double standard of aging” (Sontag 1979: 462) or “gendered ageism” (Itzin and Phillipson 1995).\footnote{5}

Finally, while the interaction term GENDER*CHILDREN is negative as predicted under H3, it remains statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, calculating the marginal effects of children on men and women, we see that the total effect of children for women (i.e. 0.094−0.049=0.045) is statistically insignificant (Chi²=0.65; p=0.42) whereas it is associated with significantly more outside jobs for men (0.094; p<0.01). The same basic relation shows up in Columns (5) and (6). These results imply that while men have more outside jobs when they have children—possibly to generate more income to support the family—women do not (at least not significantly so). One possible explanation is that the men in our sample are more likely than the women to have a spouse at home investing significant time in the household (since highly qualified women are more likely to be part of dual career couples than highly qualified men). As such, men might simply retain more time for outside activities than women when the family expands.\footnote{11} Alternatively, traditional gender roles—imposing childcare on women—may provide a stronger counterweight on women than men to the need to generate more income.

5. Conclusion and Discussion

Normative discussions of MPs’ extra-parliamentary activities often overlook that not all politicians engage in moonlighting. This paper has taken a first step to address this gap by
investigating the—thus far largely neglected—determinants of moonlighting activity. Obtaining testable hypotheses from the literatures on the glass-ceiling effect and gender stereotyping, we thereby focused on the effect of MPs’ gender. Our empirical results—using data on 197 female and 417 male German MPs over the period 10/2005-09/2007—indicate that gender matters strongly for the number of politicians’ outside jobs (controlling for MPs’ party affiliation, religion, political position, and other factors). These findings illustrate that gender continues to have a manifest influence on recruitment decisions even when studying individuals of higher-than-average ability working in a strongly politicised environment. This is an important finding as individuals “at the very top of society’s hierarchy” arguably “already eliminated potential distractions” from gender effects (Hansson 2010: 3), making our sample a least-likely case for finding structural effects. The article thus complements extensive research documenting the effects of gender on purely political careers and private-sector hiring and promotion decisions (see above).

It is important, however, to abstain from normative judgements based on our empirical findings. Although gender discrimination or employers’ pro-male bias is one possible interpretation, another might be that women are less likely than men to seek and/or accept offers of (especially private-sector) sideline activities. Assuming such offers are equally distributed across gender (i.e. no gender-based discrimination), our observations would likewise come about when women are less likely than men to accept them. In such interpretation, women are not discriminated against, but rather could be seen as being more risk averse (e.g., to avoid potential electoral risks or conflicts of interest associated with outside jobs; for a review of evidence on women’s higher risk aversion, see Borghans et al. 2008), more conscientious about adequately fulfilling their parliamentary work, or more constrained in their time budget (e.g., for family reasons or due to higher involvement in outside activities that do not require reporting).

Unfortunately, as mentioned above, our data do not allow disentangling these various interpretations because we only observe the final distribution of outside jobs across politicians,
not the number of offers sought, made and/or accepted/rejected. In future work, it would therefore be of interest to complement the current analysis with a more detailed evaluation—for example, via (semi-)structured interviews—of participants at both sides of the studied recruitment market (in terms of application behaviour, job offering, acceptance/rejection decisions, and so on). Rather than focus on the market outcome (i.e. MPs’ observed outside positions), this provides a possibility to look more directly into the recruitment process itself. As such, a more comprehensive view on how gender (consciously or subconsciously) affects this decision-making process can be reached. Additionally, such approach would also allow more direct assessment of the potential influence of ‘old-boy networks’ in recruitment processes concerning politicians’ outside jobs.
References


ENDNOTES

i Evidently, these elements need not overlap. For example, politicians in important political positions may not only be more interesting to outside employers (Parker 1992; Becker et al. 2009), but also more reluctant to seek out and/or accept such offers due to real or perceived conflicts of interest.

ii Although perceptions of women have improved in recent decades, this basic hierarchical ordering has proven very resistant to change and remains to date (Ridgeway 2001).

iii A similar effect exists in female-dominated professions. Snyder and Green (2008: 271), for example, find that “male nurses tend to gravitate toward areas of nursing they perceive to be more masculine”.

iv While a general hypothesis, Germany’s conservative welfare state (see Esping-Andersen 1990) may strengthen this effect by institutionally promoting male breadwinners and female caregivers. Such institutional design has been argued to “strongly impact the gendered distributions of divisions of private and public work responsibilities” (Hansson 2010: 4).

v New disclosure rules detailing these categories came into effect in October 2005 (hence the start of our sample period).

vi Furthermore, for each sideline job, MPs are obliged to report ancillary income exceeding 1,000 Euro (gross) per month or 10,000 Euro (gross) per year. However, these revenues are only published in the form of three income levels: 1000-3500 Euro, 3500-7000 Euro, above 7000 Euro. Moreover, MPs are free to indicate whether they reach a given income level on a monthly or yearly basis. Clearly, this introduces significant uncertainty about actual income generated. Hence, we do not employ these income data in the analysis (see Rosenson 2007, for a similar decision on similarly reported US data).

vii Category (5) is excluded as we are interested in MPs’ current sideline activities (though only one MP declares an “agreement on future activities or pecuniary advantages”).

viii Unfortunately, the data do not indicate the time MPs invest in ancillary activities. So, we implicitly have to assume that all jobs take up an equal amount of time. As the data are self-reported, we have to presume that they are complete and correct. This, however, is not unlikely since violations of the disclosure rules are punishable by a fine of up to half an MP’s annual allowance.

ix Based on H3, one could argue for the inclusion of both the number of children and a parenthood dummy (1=at least one child, 0=otherwise). As doing so does not affect our main findings and gives insignificant results for the parenthood variable, we include only the number of children in the final model. Note also that we experimented with dummy variables for politicians with 0, 1, 2, 3 or more children. This did not indicate any
significant non-linearities in the children-effect (unlike in, e.g., Budig and England 2001), such that we retain our linear specification.

x Under the (possibly overly restrictive) assumption that employers view the hiring of politicians as a way to cultivate long-term relationships with politicians, this finding might also represent a generational effect. Indeed, given the historical over-representation of men in politics, older female members of the current Bundestag may simply not have been MP at the age when recruitment for outside positions would then mainly occur. If so, the age effect we observe should disappear in the future as later generations of female MPs may have acquired and continue to hold outside positions (see Maume 2004 for a similar argumentation on wage inequality).

xi These results complement recent findings that having children “reduces the [work-related] travel activity of women, whereas there is no consistent such effect among men” (Gustafson 2006: 513).
Figure 1: Frequency Distribution of Sideline Jobs
Table 1: Regression Results: Gender and MPs’ Sideline Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>All outside jobs</th>
<th>Private-sector</th>
<th>Public-sector</th>
<th>All outside jobs</th>
<th>Private-sector</th>
<th>Public-sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.445 ***</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>1.197 ***</td>
<td>1.343 ***</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>1.193 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>(6.44)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(4.80)</td>
<td>(5.50)</td>
<td>(-0.06)</td>
<td>(4.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>-0.308 ***</td>
<td>-0.810 ***</td>
<td>-0.159 *</td>
<td>-0.308 ***</td>
<td>-0.833 ***</td>
<td>-0.157 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=constituency-based MP)</td>
<td>(4.64)</td>
<td>(-8.52)</td>
<td>(-1.66)</td>
<td>(-5.03)</td>
<td>(-4.08)</td>
<td>(-21.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
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<tr>
<td>(0.08)</td>
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<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(-1.08)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
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<td>Green Party</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
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<td>0.134</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
<td>-1.158 ***</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(-3.91)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
<td>(-3.90)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
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<td>-0.891 ***</td>
<td>-0.676 ***</td>
<td>-0.688 ***</td>
<td>-0.909 ***</td>
<td>-0.662 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=constituency-based MP)</td>
<td>(-3.14)</td>
<td>(-1.37)</td>
<td>(-2.76)</td>
<td>(-3.57)</td>
<td>(-3.23)</td>
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<td>-0.481 ***</td>
<td>-1.113 **</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>-0.557 ***</td>
<td>-1.254 ***</td>
<td>-0.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.136 *</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>0.127 *</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(-0.32)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(-0.39)</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>-0.222 **</td>
<td>-0.284 *</td>
<td>-0.201 **</td>
<td>-0.236 ***</td>
<td>-0.301 **</td>
<td>-0.209 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=East-German MP)</td>
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<td>(-1.63)</td>
<td>(-1.73)</td>
<td>(-2.47)</td>
<td>(-1.74)</td>
<td>(-1.87)</td>
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<td>(-0.137)</td>
<td>(-0.135)</td>
<td>(-0.135)</td>
<td>(-0.132)</td>
<td>(-0.139)</td>
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<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.576 ***</td>
<td>0.186 **</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.581 ***</td>
<td>0.186 *</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>(1.65)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(-3.34)</td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>0.191 ***</td>
<td>-0.230 *</td>
<td>0.325 ***</td>
<td>0.208 **</td>
<td>-0.213 *</td>
<td>0.336 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>(-1.42)</td>
<td>(-2.32)</td>
<td>(2.36)</td>
<td>(-1.34)</td>
<td>(-3.39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>-0.141 **</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.143 *</td>
<td>-0.135 *</td>
<td>-0.132 *</td>
<td>-0.139 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=yes)</td>
<td>(-1.65)</td>
<td>(-0.15)</td>
<td>(-0.95)</td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
<td>(-1.51)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIVERSITY</td>
<td>-0.208 ***</td>
<td>-0.367 ***</td>
<td>-0.163 *</td>
<td>-0.342 ***</td>
<td>-0.521 ***</td>
<td>-0.259 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=holds university degree)</td>
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<td>(-2.40)</td>
<td>(-1.57)</td>
<td>(-3.14)</td>
<td>(-2.92)</td>
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<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.253 *</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics background</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
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<td>0.225 *</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.254 **</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teacher background</td>
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<td>-0.415 **</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.425 **</td>
<td>0.073</td>
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<td>TERMS</td>
<td>0.051 ***</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.064 ***</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.055 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(term in parliament)</td>
<td>(2.35)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(-0.19)</td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILDREN</td>
<td>0.079 ***</td>
<td>0.150 ***</td>
<td>0.055 **</td>
<td>0.094 ***</td>
<td>0.167 ***</td>
<td>0.068 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(number of children)</td>
<td>(2.83)</td>
<td>(3.13)</td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
<td>(3.05)</td>
<td>(3.24)</td>
<td>(1.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.009 **</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.025 **</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(years)</td>
<td>(-0.18)</td>
<td>(2.49)</td>
<td>(-1.65)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(3.06)</td>
<td>(-1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>-0.838 ***</td>
<td>0.344 ***</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>-0.835 ***</td>
<td>0.342 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(-2.22)</td>
<td>(-2.27)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
<td>(-2.19)</td>
<td>(-2.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary of state</td>
<td>0.238 **</td>
<td>-0.249</td>
<td>0.386 ***</td>
<td>0.221 **</td>
<td>-0.280 **</td>
<td>0.390 ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member party fraction</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leadershp</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>(-0.27)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader party fraction</td>
<td>0.497 ***</td>
<td>0.540 *</td>
<td>0.529 **</td>
<td>0.487 ***</td>
<td>0.492 *</td>
<td>0.519 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitute leader</td>
<td>0.113 *</td>
<td>0.197 **</td>
<td>0.115 *</td>
<td>0.105 *</td>
<td>0.185 *</td>
<td>0.112 *</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>0.179 **</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>0.276 ***</td>
<td>0.223 ***</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.304 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-president</td>
<td>0.643 ***</td>
<td>-0.648 *</td>
<td>0.814 ***</td>
<td>0.670 ***</td>
<td>-0.622 *</td>
<td>0.816 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundestag</td>
<td>(2.41)</td>
<td>(-1.64)</td>
<td>(2.82)</td>
<td>(2.30)</td>
<td>(-1.49)</td>
<td>(2.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER</td>
<td>-0.130 *</td>
<td>-0.774 ***</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.63)</td>
<td>(-5.13)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(-0.14)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER * CHILDREN</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER * TERMS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER * AGE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENDER * UNIVERSITY</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-1455.94</td>
<td>-835.62</td>
<td>-1288.51</td>
<td>-1451.03</td>
<td>-830.82</td>
<td>-1287.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi² (R)</td>
<td>131.39 ***</td>
<td>160.68 ***</td>
<td>99.23 ***</td>
<td>139.67 ***</td>
<td>168.93 ***</td>
<td>105.18 ***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: N=614; t-values based on robust standard errors between brackets: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10% (one-tailed). Wald-test indicates joint significance of all regressors (with R equal to the number of regressors minus one).
**Appendix A**

### Table A1: Summary statistics central variables, by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All outside jobs</th>
<th>Private-sector jobs</th>
<th>Public-sector jobs</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Terms in office</th>
<th>Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=614)</td>
<td>4.047 (3.592)</td>
<td>1.156 (1.840)</td>
<td>2.891 (2.797)</td>
<td>49.393 (9.644)</td>
<td>0.799 (0.401)</td>
<td>2.951 (1.851)</td>
<td>1.531 (1.362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=417)</td>
<td>4.374 (3.825)</td>
<td>1.470 (2.075)</td>
<td>2.904 (2.898)</td>
<td>49.988 (9.985)</td>
<td>0.815 (0.388)</td>
<td>3.048 (1.999)</td>
<td>1.691 (1.420)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=197)</td>
<td>3.355 (2.929)</td>
<td>0.492 (0.896)</td>
<td>2.863 (2.577)</td>
<td>48.132 (8.772)</td>
<td>0.766 (0.424)</td>
<td>2.746 (1.473)</td>
<td>1.193 (1.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men=Women</strong></td>
<td>3.633 *** (8.147 ***</td>
<td>0.177 **</td>
<td>2.239 **</td>
<td>1.368</td>
<td>2.102 **</td>
<td>4.603 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries represent mean value across politicians in a given group, the associated standard deviation (between brackets) and the range from minimum to maximum [in square brackets]. ‘Men=Women’ is the significance level of a non-parametric difference-in-means t-test allowing for unequal variance across samples.