Matching Market Design: Strategy - Proofness and Beyond

The WZB is planning an international conference on matching markets held as a two-day workshop on July 13–14, 2023, at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany. The conference will be organized by Dorothea Kübler (WZB), Christian Basteck (WZB/FU) and Vincent Meisner (TU).

In the design of matching markets, it is important to elicit the privately known preferences of participants. Therefore, economists have focused on strategy-proof mechanisms which incentivize the truthful revelation of preferences and rule out any incentives to strategically misreport them. Unfortunately, as a growing body of evidence documents, strategy-proofness by itself is not sufficient to elicit truthful information on preferences.

The workshop will bring together leading international researchers from North America, Europe, and Asia to present their latest research on this central design objective, including its limitations. In particular, we aim to discuss theoretical contributions on axiomatic characterizations, complexity notions, behavioral biases, and non-standard constraints, as well as applied work that incorporates experimental and field data.