Matching Market Design: Strategy - Proofness and Beyond

In the design of matching markets, it is important to elicit the privately known preferences of participants. Therefore, economists have focused on strategy-proof mechanisms which incentivize the truthful revelation of preferences and rule out any incentives to strategically misreport them. Unfortunately, as a growing body of evidence documents, strategy-proofness by itself is not sufficient to elicit truthful information on preferences.

The workshop will bring together leading international researchers from North America, Europe, and Asia to present their latest research on this central design objective, including its limitations. In particular, we aim to discuss theoretical contributions on axiomatic characterizations, complexity notions, behavioral biases, and non-standard constraints, as well as applied work that incorporates experimental and field data.

The conference is organized by Dorothea Kübler (WZB), Christian Basteck (WZB/FU), and Vincent Meisner (TU).

The data protection notice on photo and film recordings can be found here.

The venue is wheelchair accessible. Please let Friederike Theilen-Kosch (friederike.theilen-kosch [at] wzb.eu) know if you need any special assistance.